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Development	is	God’s	method	in	the	education	of	the	race.	Whatever	in	religion	is	destined	to	
endure	must	be	the	offspring	of	the	past.	It	must	be	related	to	the	old	by	natural	descent.	It	must	
come	as	Christianity	came,	by	providential	agencies	springing	from	the	bosom	of	the	Church	and	
working	in	its	name,	and	not	by	come-outers	acting	of	the	Church	from	without.	All	the	reformers	of	
the	Church	hitherto,	all	who	have	contributed	anything	effectual	to	correct	its	errors,	to	enlarge	its	
views,	to	quicken	its	zeal,	-	Luther,	Fox,	Swedenborg,	Wesley,	Channing,	-	have	been	disciples	and	
preachers	of	that	faith	which	they	have	helped	to	new-mould	and	reform.		
	
– F.H.	Hedge,	from:	Antisupernaturalism	in	the	Pulpit,	address	delivered	to	the	alumni	of	Harvard	
Divinity	School,	1864.	
	
_____ 
	
	
All things in nature are beautiful types to the soul that can read them; 
   Nothing exists upon earth, but for unspeakable ends, 
Every object that speaks to the senses was meant for the spirit; 
   Nature is but a scroll; God's hand-writing thereon. 
Ages ago when man was pure, ere the flood overwhelmed him, 
   While in the image of God every soul yet lived, 
Every thing stood as a letter or word of a language familiar, 
   Telling of truths which now only the angels can read. 
	
– Christopher Pearse Cranch, ‘Correspondences’ (1839), first two stanzas. 
	
	
_____ 
	
	
“I	have	sometimes	spoken	with	angels	about	heavenly	dwelling-houses,	and	said	to	them	that	hardly	
any	one	upon	earth	believes	that	angels	have	need	of	such	accommodation;	some	because	they	have	
no	sensible	proof	of	the	fact;	others	because	they	do	not	know	that	angels	are	men;	others	still	because	
they	believe	that	the	angelic	heaven	is	the	visible	vault	overhead;	and	inasmuch	as	this	vault	appears	
empty,	and	they	suppose	angels	to	be	ethereal	creatures,	they	conclude	that	angels	live	in	the	ether.	
Besides,	as	they	are	ignorant	of	everything	spiritual,	they	have	no	conception	how	such	things	can	exist	
in	the	spiritual	world	as	exist	in	the	natural.	The	angels	replied	that	this	was	no	news	to	them…”	
	
–	excerpt	from	Swedenborg’s	De	Cœlo	et	Inferno	(1758).	
	
	
_____ 
	
	
Truth exists for us in layers. There are truths of the letter and truths of the spirit; there is truth 
to fact, and truth to fancy; there is truth to the individual soul, and truth to the public 
conscience; there is truth to the heart, to the moral sense, to the spiritual intuition; but it will 
not do to charge lack of truthfulness upon anybody simply because he does not hold the same 
opinion with ourselves. 
	
– O.B. Frothingham, Recollections and Impressions (1891). 
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INTRODUCTION		
Emanuel	 Swedenborg	 (1688-1772)1	was	 an	 eighteenth-century	 Swedish	 scientist	 who	 worked	 and	
published	extensively	on	a	broad	range	of	scientific	subjects	in	his	day:	from	physics	and	chemistry	to	
biology	 to	 astronomy.	 However,	 although	 Swedenborg	 can	 be	 appreciated	 as	 an	 Enlightenment	
polymath,	he	is	generally	regarded	as	a	‘mystic’.	At	the	peak	of	his	career,	in	1743	when	he	was	in	his	
early	 fifties,	 he	 experienced	 a	 profound	 existential	 crisis	 that	 sparked	 a	 long	 period	of	 visions	 and	
‘spiritual	 encounters’.	Maybe	Swedenborg’s	 existential	 crisis	 occurred	not	quite	by	 accident	 at	 the	
time	 of	 the	 First	 Great	 Awakening	 that	 swept	 Protestant	 Europe	 and	 the	 English-speaking	 British	
colonies	 in	 America	 as	 from	 the	 1730s	 and	 1740s.	 All	 the	 same,	 for	 the	 remainder	 of	 his	 life	 his	
writing	 was	 dedicated	 to	 what	 he	 perceived	 to	 be	 ‘spiritual	 travels’,	 ‘angelic	 encounters’,	 and	
‘celestial	communications’.		
Swedenborg’s	 theological	writings	 have	 had	 a	 profound	 and	 lasting	 impact,	 and	 his	 legacy	
has	 been	 an	 inspiration	 to	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 alternative	 spiritual	 currents	 and	 movements,	
especially	in	America.	Historian	of	religion	Leigh	Eric	Schmidt	explains:		
	
In	 the	mid-1740s,	 after	 long	 years	 of	 scientific	 inquiry,	 Swedenborg	 experienced	 a	 religious	
awakening	that	transformed	him	from	natural	philosopher	to	seer.	Out	of	his	newly	opened	
spiritual	sight	came	a	vast	array	of	writings:	visionary	commentaries	opening	up	the	spiritual	
sense	 of	 biblical	 texts	 as	 well	 as	 detailed	 reports	 on	 his	 grand	 tours	 of	 heaven	 and	 hell.	
Swedenborg	 took	 the	 Christian	 and	 occultist	 fascination	with	 hidden	 correspondences	 to	 a	
new	level	of	empirical	exactness;	everywhere	Swedenborg	turned	he	discovered	mystical	signs	
of	the	invisible	world	beyond	the	visible.	…	Even	more	mysterious	was	his	self-reported	ability	
to	“converse	with	angels	and	spirits	in	the	same	manner	as	I	speak	with	men,”	and	it	was	his	
memorable	relations	of	things	seen	and	heard	in	the	celestial	world	that	especially	garnered	
him	 a	 significant	 readership.	 By	 the	 1840s,	 his	 posthumous	 fame	 had	made	 him	 the	most	
influential	‘mystic’	in	the	United	States.2		
	
In	an	American	newspaper	article	from	June	1882,	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham	(1822-1895)	
presents	a	wholly	different	 image	of	Swedenborg.	Frothingham	rejects	any	mystical	 interpretations	
of	 Swedenborg’s	 visionary	 theology	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 approach	 of	 his	 writings	 from	 a	 philosophical																																																									1	For	a	biography	on	Swedenborg,	see	for	example:	Inge	Jonsson,	Emanuel	Swedenborg.	(New	York:	Twayne,	1971);	Cyriel	O.	Sigstedt,	The	Swedenborg	Epic:	The	Life	and	Works	of	Emanuel	Swedenborg.	(New	York:	Bookman	Associates,	1952);	Signe	Toksvig,	Emanuel	Swedenborg:	Scientist	and	Mystic	(New	York:	Yale	University	Press,	1948);	Larsen,	R.	(ed.),	Emanuel	Swedenborg:	A	Continuing	Vision.	(New	York:	Swedenborg	Foundation,	1988).		2	Schmidt,	Restless	Souls:	The	Making	of	American	Spirituality,	45.	
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angle.	 Frothingham	 pleads	 his	 case	 for	 Swedenborg	 as	 a	 philosopher	 and	 social	 reformer.3	In	 his	
article	 titled	 ‘Swedenborg’,	published	 in	The	North	American	Review,	 he	addresses	 the	problem	of	
the	origins	of	Swedenborg’s	teachings,	namely	that	these	are	derived	from	visions,	and	hence,	do	not	
have	a	‘legitimate’	basis.		
Frothingham	opens	by	 acknowledging	 Swedenborg’s	 value	 as	 a	 scientist.	However,	 despite	
Swedenborg’s	many	achievements	in	the	natural	sciences,	“his	eminence	in	the	scientific	world	is	but	
dimly	and	grudgingly	 recognized.	How	shall	 this	be	explained?	The	honours	 that	were	 tendered	 to	
him,	the	admission	of	his	vast	services	by	contemporaries,	only	make	the	riddle	more	perplexing”.4	
The	riddle	that	Frothingham	points	to	–	the	fact	that	Swedenborg’s	name	does	not	spark	wide	and	
wholehearted	acclaim	–	is	heightened	by	the	fact	that	‘disciples’	of	Swedenborg	make	great	efforts	
to	spread	the	doctrines	of	their	teacher.		
Frothingham	 is	 careful	 to	 distinguish	 between	 Swedenborg	 and	 ‘Swedenborgianism’;	 the	
latter	 refers	 to	 the	 ideas	 that	were	disseminated	by	 the	General	 Convention	of	 the	Church	of	 the	
New	Jerusalem	that	had	established	 itself	 in	1817.	According	to	Frothingham,	“whatever	our	views	
respecting	Swedenborg,	Swedenborgianism,	as	a	form	of	religious	institution,	has	outlived	its	excuse	
for	being”.5	But	 the	 fate	awaiting	 the	ecclesiastical	organisation	of	Swedenborgians	 is	 shared.	“The	
New	 Jerusalem	 church	 ranks	 among	 so-called	 liberal	 churches,	 whose	 future	 is	 extinction.	 All	
churches	are	fast	becoming	liberal,	and	in	proportion	as	they	follow	that	tendency,	as	churches	they	
pass	away”.6	Frothingham	goes	on	to	argue	that	other	religious	and	philosophical	phenomena	of	the	
era,	 such	as	Transcendentalism,	Fourierism,	Brook	Farm	–	which	will	be	explained	below7	–,	either	
have	come	to	an	end	or	are	on	the	wane.	And	so,	he	asks:	“Why	should	Swedenborgianism,	the	other	
branch	of	the	same	vine,	survive?”8		
The	 question,	 however,	 seems	 rhetorical.	 Frothingham	 finds	 answers	 in	 the	 power	 of	
Swedenborg’s	 thoughts,	 their	 “accord	 with	 the	 natural	 instinct	 of	 the	 heart”.9	But	 he	 expresses	
severe	 concerns	 at	 Swedenborg’s	 claims	 to	 receiving	 his	 revelations	 through	 conversations	 with																																																									3	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	613.	4	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	600.	5	Ibid.,	602.	6	Ibid.,	608.	7	‘Transcendentalism’	is	clarified	in	Chapter	1,	pp	13-15;	an	explanation	of	‘Fourierism’	and	‘Brook	Farm’	can	be	found	on	page	32.		8	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	602.	Actually,	‘Swedenborgianism’	in	America	did	survive,	albeit	barely.	
Today,	several	historically	related	Christian	denominations	that	developed	as	a	result	of	Swedenborg’s	writings	
have	assembled	under	the	name	‘The	New	Church’.	Its	branches	comprise	of	the	Swedenborgian	Church	of	
North	America	(also	known	as	the	General	Convention),	the	General	Church	of	the	New	Jerusalem,	the	Lord's	
New	Church	Which	Is	Nova	Hierosolyma,	and	the	General	Conference	of	the	New	Church	in	Great	Britain.	In	
2000,	total	membership	was	less	than	10,000.	9	Ibid.,	602.	
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angels	 and	 spirits.	 The	 fact	 that	 Swedenborg	 ascribes	 his	 ideas	 to	 divine	 revelation	 as	 well	 as	 his	
appeal	to	 ‘celestial	communications’	with	the	help	of	angels	and	spirits	rather	weakens	their	force.	
“The	seraphic	quality	of	the	revelation	turns	the	so-called	‘proof’	into	an	impertinence.	The	claim	to	
‘angelic’	authentication	is	really	a	drag	on	the	doctrine”.10	
Interestingly,	 in	 the	 article	 Frothingham	 declares	 himself	 to	 have	 been	 a	 Swedenborgian	
thirty	years	earlier,	“simply	on	account	of	his	sympathy	with	certain	ideas”,	even	though	at	the	time	
he	had	never	read	any	of	Swedenborg’s	books.11	How	did	Frothingham	hear	of	these	‘ideas’?	Could	
he	be	referring	 to	Ralph	Waldo	Emerson’s	book	Representative	Men	 that	was	published	 in	1850	 in	
which	 Swedenborg	 is	 portrayed	 as	 the	 archetype	 of	 the	 ‘mystic’?	 In	 the	 article	 by	 Frothingham,	
however,	Emerson	is	criticized	with	respect	to	his	portrayal	of	Swedenborg.	“If	Mr.	Emerson’s	verdict	
is	final,	Swedenborg’s	day	is	done.	But	if	there	is	yet	another	word	to	be	said,	it	may	be	to	the	effect	
that	the	seer	has	transcended	his	limitations	and	opened	an	original	path	for	thought”.12	The	person	
most	 qualified	 to	 expose	 this	 ‘path’	would	 be	 Henry	 James	 Sr,	 “the	 only	man	who	 has	 dug	 out	 a	
secret	treasure	of	thought	worthy	to	be	kept”.13		
	
Scope	and	Terminology	
Intrigued	by	the	article	 I	 felt	a	host	of	questions	come	up.	Who	was	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham,	
and	 what	 urged	 him	 to	 write	 an	 article	 on	 Swedenborg?	 Why	 did	 he	 opt	 for	 an	 alternative	
interpretation	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 teachings?	 To	 what	 extent	 did	 Frothingham’s	 background	 as	 a	
Unitarian	 minister	 play	 a	 role	 in	 his	 assessment	 of	 Swedenborg?	 What	 was	 his	 relationship	 with	
Ralph	 Waldo	 Emerson	 and	 the	 Transcendentalist	 movement?	 Why	 did	 Frothingham	 favour	 the	
interpretation	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 teachings	 by	 Henry	 James	 Sr?	 And,	 finally,	 can	 Frothingham’s	
objections	to	a	‘mystical’	interpretation	of	Swedenborg	be	situated	in	the	broader	perspective	of	the	
field	 of	 Western	 esotericism?	 Combining	 these	 questions	 led	 me	 to	 the	 formulation	 of	 a	 central	
research	question:		
	
What	does	Frothingham’s	article	on	Swedenborg	of	June	1882	in	the	North	American	Review	
tell	 us	 about	 nineteenth-century	 American	 religious	 liberalism	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
epistemological	problematic	of	‘immediate	revelation’?	
	
																																																								10	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	602.	11	Ibid.,	605.	12	Ibid.,	615.	13	Ibid.,	609.	
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In	Christianity,	 ‘revelation’	 is	a	complex	topic	that	may	be	approached	from	many	different	
angles.	 In	 general,	 ‘revelation’	 is	 understood	 to	 mean	 the	 revealing	 or	 disclosing	 of	 truth	 or	
knowledge	 by	 the	 divine.	 Basically,	 ‘revelation’	 is	 a	 form	 of	 communication	 in	 which	 God	 reveals	
Himself	or	His	divine	will	to	the	world	of	human	beings.	Traditional	modes	of	divine	communication	
that	 hold	 a	 prominent	 place	 in	 Christian	 traditions	 are	 religious	 texts,	 most	 notably	 the	 Bible	 –	
whether	 considered	 as	 inspired	 by	 God	 or	 as	 divine	 dictation.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 divine	
immanence,	God	 is	understood	 to	 reveal	himself	 through	Nature	or	 the	material	world	of	objects.	
Furthermore,	 ‘revelation’	may	 take	 the	 form	 of	 a	 divine-human	 encounter	 in	 which	 Deity	 reveals	
Itself	through	direct	contact.	This	mode	of	communication	often	occurs	by	way	of	visions	or	voices.	
Also,	 the	divine	may	be	present	 in	 the	encounter	directly	or	 indirectly	 through	an	 intermediary	or	
agent,	like	an	angel	or	spirit.	Moreover,	‘revelation’	can	relate	to	the	process	of	divine	revealing	itself	
as	well	as	to	the	outcome	of	the	process.		
	 This	thesis	addresses	the	topic	of	direct	revelation	as	a	form	of	divine-human	encounter	from	
the	perspective	of	epistemology:	how	to	know?	How	to	know	whether	the	experience	is	‘real’?	How	
to	know	whether	the	revelation	is	‘true’?	The	problem	involved	in	claims	of	‘revelatory	experiences’	
is	epistemological	certainty	–	how	to	confirm	or	deny	the	validity	of	such	a	claim.	Hence,	the	scope	of	
this	 thesis	 can	 be	 formulated	 as	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 historiography	 of	 a	 problem	 –	 known	 as	
Problemgeschichte	 in	Max	Weber’s	 terms	 –	 specifically,	 the	 problem	of	 ‘revelation’	 as	 a	 source	 of	
direct,	 experiential	 knowledge.	 Hereafter	 we	 will	 refer	 to	 this	 type	 of	 revelation	 as	 ‘immediate	
revelation’.	 Central	 is	 the	 claim	 to	 ‘immediate	 revelation’	 by	 Emanuel	 Swedenborg	 and	 the	
epistemological	problematic	that	this	claim	involved	–	as	perceived	by	O.B.	Frothingham.		
	 My	aim	 is	not	 to	 trace	an	 intellectual	or	 theological	development,	 rather	 I	have	 selected	a	
moment	in	time	–	1882	–	from	where	I	am	looking	outward	in	all	directions;	backwards	to	obtain	an	
understanding	 of	 how	 Frothingham	 arrived	 at	 his	 position;	 sideways	 to	 possible	 influences	 by	
Emerson	 and	 the	 elder	 James;	 and	 forwards	 to	 see	 what	 may	 have	 emerged	 as	 consequence	 or	
impact.		
Recapitulating:	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 address	 the	 epistemological	 problematic	 of	 ‘immediate	
revelation’,	 set	 against	 the	 liberal	 religious	 landscape	 of	 nineteenth-century	 America.	My	 point	 of	
entry	 will	 be	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 theological	 writings	 of	 Emanuel	 Swedenborg	 by	 Octavius	
Brooks	 Frothingham,	with	 a	 special	 focus	 on	 influences	 by	 Ralph	Waldo	Emerson	 (1803-1882)	 and	
Henry	James	Sr	(1811-1882).	Ultimately,	I	hope	to	situate	this	thesis	in	the	broader	perspective	of	the	
field	of	Western	esotericism.		
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On	Method	and	Sources	
As	indicated,	the	1882	article	by	Frothingham	will	serve	as	the	springboard	for	the	exploration	of	the	
nineteenth-century	American	liberal	religious	landscape.	Hence,	my	research	is	source-driven	rather	
than	theory-driven.	However,	 theoretical	 reflection	 is	 implicit	 in	the	selection	and	 interpretation	of	
my	sources,	and	inherent	to	the	historical-critical	analysis	of	my	findings.		
With	 respect	 to	 sources	 on	 the	 origins	 and	 development	 of	 American	 Unitarianism	 and	
Transcendentalism,	 a	 selection	 of	 primary	 and	 secondary	 historical	 sources	 will	 present	 a	 cross	
section	over	time.	As	Frothingham	has	been	lauded	as	the	historian	of	Transcendentalism	as	well	as	
the	biographer	of	several	of	its	leading	New	England	intellectuals,	his	books	serve	as	primary	sources	
of	which	I	have	made	ample	use.	Transcendentalism	in	particular	has	inspired	extensive	scholarship,	
and	 I	 have	 been	 forced	 to	 restrain	 myself	 in	 the	 selection	 of	 additional	 sources.	 Selected	 were	
reputable	authors,	such	as	Dorrien,	Howe,	Hutchison,	Miller,	Persons,	Wilbur,	Wright.	
	 While	there	 is	an	abundance	of	scholarly	material	available	on	Emerson	and	his	 intellectual	
development,	this	is	not	the	case	with	respect	to	his	essay	‘Swedenborg’.	However,	I	was	fortunate	
to	find	a	dissertation	by	Kenneth	Kurtz14,	describing	Emerson	and	his	intellectual	development	with	
respect	to	the	conception	and	writing	of	Representative	Men.	Although	Kurtz	approaches	the	topic	
from	 a	 specific	 angle,	 his	 study	 is	 still	 very	 suitable	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Two	 more	
dissertations	–	by	Richard	Kenneth	Silver15	and	Robert	H.	Kirven16	–	help	to	shed	light	on	the	liberal	
religious	 ‘milieu’	 in	 which	 Swedenborgianism	 as	 an	 institutional	 religion	 emerged	 and	 on	 the	
responses	 that	 Swedenborg’s	 claims	 to	 ‘revelation’	 invoked.	 Finally,	 approaches	by	Antoine	Faivre,	
Wouter	Hanegraaff	and	Kocku	von	Stuckrad	will	be	 instrumental	 in	navigating	the	 field	of	Western	
esotericism.	
	
Structure	of	this	thesis	
From	 my	 brief	 review	 of	 Frothingham’s	 article	 I	 have	 distilled	 three	 main	 directions	 for	 further	
research,	 formulated	as	 subquestions.	 1)	How	did	Emerson	arrive	at	his	 choice	 for	 Swedenborg	as	
the	 archetype	 for	 the	 ‘mystic’	 in	Representative	Men?	2)	Why	did	 Frothingham	opt	 for	 a	different	
interpretation	 of	 Swedenborg	 –	 a	 philosopher	 and	 social	 reformer	 rather	 than	 a	mystic?	 And,	 on	
what	 grounds	 does	 Frothingham	 favour	 the	 interpretation	 by	 Henry	 James	 Sr	 over	 Emerson’s?	
3)	How	 can	 we	 account	 for	 Frothingham’s	 uneasiness	 with	 the	 ‘angelic	 origins’	 of	 Swedenborg’s	
																																																								14	Kurtz,	K.,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men.	Yale	University,	1947.	15	Silver,	R.K.,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America:	The	Influence	of	Emanuel	Swedenborg	on	American	Society	
and	Culture,	1815-1860.	Stanford	University,	1983.	16	Kirven,	R.H.,	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism.	Brandeis	University,	1965.		
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theology?	Consequently,	the	structure	of	this	thesis	is	based	on	three	main	chapters,	allowing	for	a	
chronological	build-up	of	my	argument.		
	 The	 first	 chapter	 will	 cover	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 concisely	 sketching	
notable	 religious	 movements	 and	 ideas	 of	 this	 era	 –	 Unitarianism,	 Transcendentalism,	 American	
Swedenborgianism.	From	there	I	will	extensively	address	and	discuss	the	essay	‘Swedenborg’	in	the	
book	 Representative	 Men	 (1850)	 by	 R.W.	 Emerson.	 The	 relevance	 of	 Emerson’s	 essay	 lies	 in	 the	
manner	 in	 which	 his	 portrayal	 of	 Swedenborg	 –	 the	 Emersonian	 ‘frame’	 of	 Swedenborg	 as	 the	
archetypical	mystic	–	has	shaped	perceptions	in	general,	and	of	O.B.	Frothingham	in	particular.		
	 The	next	chapter	will	 introduce	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham	and	the	transformation	of	his	
beliefs	 over	 time.	 It	 will	 again	 address	 elements	 in	 the	 1882	 article,	 and	 discuss	 Frothingham’s	
critique	 of	 Emerson.	 Also,	 it	 will	 provide	 a	 brief	 introduction	 of	 Henry	 James	 Sr	 as	 a	 nineteenth-
century	 Swedenborgian.	More	 importantly,	 this	 chapter	will	 identify	 the	particularity	 involving	 the	
claim	to	‘immediate	revelation’	by	Swedenborg.			
	 In	the	last	chapter	my	findings	will	situated	in	the	broader	perspective	of	the	field	of	Western	
esotericism	through	a	brief	discussion	of	the	approaches	of	Faivre,	Hanegraaff,	and	Von	Stuckrad.	By	
addressing	 questions	 as	 to	 what	 extent	 Swedenborg’s	 claims	 to	 ‘immediate	 revelation’	 can	 be	
articulated	 as	 an	 epistemological	 problem,	 and	how	 this	 ‘problem’	 can	be	positioned	 in	 a	 broader	
perspective,	I	will	shift	the	focus	from	religious	liberalism	to	Western	esotericism.	Although	this	may	
seem	like	a	strange	move	–	somewhat	‘incongruously’,	as	Frothingham	would	put	it	–	the	purpose	of	
this	paradigm	shift	is	to	illustrate	Frothingham’s	participation	in	the	discursive	realities	of	nineteenth-
century	America	that	go	beyond	the	‘textbook	descriptions’	–	as	argued	by	Hanegraaff.	
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	CHAPTER	1	 ‘FRAMING	SWEDENBORG’	
	
In	his	book	Representative	Men,	published	in	1850,	Ralph	Waldo	Emerson	chose	Swedenborg	as	the	
archetype	for	the	‘mystic’.	How	did	he	arrive	at	this	choice?	Answering	this	question	starts	in	the	first	
half	of	 the	nineteenth	century	when	Unitarianism	has	gained	a	stronghold	 in	Boston	and	environs.	
Focusing	 on	 New	 England’s	 Unitarian	 intellectuals	 we	 see	 the	 emergence	 of	 Transcendentalism,	
inspired	by	Emerson	and	his	contemporaries.	Meanwhile	Swedenborg’s	thought	has	begun	to	settle	
in	 antebellum	 America.	 Next,	 this	 chapter	 addresses	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 the	 essay	
‘Swedenborg’	as	part	of	Representative	Men	was	conceived	as	the	archetypical	‘mystical’	frame.		
	
1.1	 The	heterodox	enclave	of	New	England	Unitarianism	
In	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	–	after	the	War	of	1812	–	America	went	through	a	period	of	
immense	economic,	social	and	political	change.	During	this	time	American	religion	also	experienced	
profound	changes.	The	Second	Great	Awakening	had	set	off	a	pietistic	spark	in	Calvinism	that	ignited	
an	evangelical,	 revivalist	movement.	 Protestant	hegemony,	however,	was	affected	by	 the	 influx	of	
Irish	Catholic	immigrants	in	the	1840s;	their	growing	numbers	posed	a	threat	to	the	Congregational	
churches	 in	 America.17	Early	 industrialization	 in	 the	 North	 contrasted	 with	 the	 cotton	 plantation	
economy	in	the	Southern	states	that	relied	heavily	on	slave	labour,	turning	slavery	and	abolition	into	
polarizing	topics.		
	 In	 New	 England	 Protestant	 Calvinist	 orthodoxy	 had	 been	 challenged	 by	 Unitarianism.	
Historian	 and	 Unitarian	 minister	 Earl	 Morse	Wilbur	 (1866-1956)	 characterized	 Unitarianism	 by	 its	
devotion	to	three	leading	principles:	“first,	complete	mental	freedom	in	religion	rather	than	bondage	
to	creeds	or	confessions;	second,	the	unrestricted	use	of	reason	in	religion,	rather	than	reliance	upon	
external	authority	or	past	tradition;	third,	generous	tolerance	of	differing	religious	views	and	usages	
rather	than	insistence	upon	uniformity	in	doctrine,	worship	or	polity”.18		
	 Wilbur	has	done	extensive	research	on	the	degree	to	which	American	Unitarianism	built	on	
the	 legacy	 of	 Polish	 Socinianism,	 Transylvanian	Unitarianism,	 and	 the	 British	Unitarian	 tradition	 of	
Joseph	Priestley	(1733-1804)	and	Theophilus	Lindsey	(1723-1808).	Although	he	traces	the	origins	of	
Unitarianism	 through	 Socinianism	 and	 its	 antecedents	 in	 Europe,	 to	 most	 historians	 –	 including	
Wilbur	–	Unitarianism	in	America	is	understood	to	be	of	indigenous	origin,	largely	independent	in	its	
earliest	development	of	similar	tendencies	in	European	Christianity.19		
																																																								17	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	11.	18	Wilbur,	A	History	of	Unitarianism:	Socinianism	and	its	Antecedents,	5.	19	Wright,	The	Beginnings	of	Unitarianism	in	America,	6.	
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	 Instrumental	 in	 Unitarianism’s	 formative	 years	 were	 Harvard-educated	 Puritans	 who	
gradually	absorbed	Enlightenment	ideas	over	the	course	of	the	eighteenth	century.	In	1805,	with	the	
appointment	of	Unitarian	Henry	Ware	as	the	Hollis	Professor	of	Divinity	at	Harvard,	 these	 ‘liberals’	
broke	sharply	with	the	more	‘orthodox’	Congregationalists,	sparking	a	period	known	as	the	Unitarian	
Controversy	in	which	Congregational	churches	grew	more	divided,	and	Unitarianism	became	the	new	
“unofficial	orthodoxy	of	Boston	and	its	environs”.20		
	 At	this	point	the	question	may	be	justified	as	to	the	relevance	of	the	religious	liberalism	of	a	
small	 intellectual	elite	at	a	 specific	geographical	 location.	Daniel	Walker	Howe	 (1937-)	 stresses	 the	
fact	 that	 Harvard	 Unitarianism	 “occupied	 a	 tiny	 heterodox	 enclave	 in	 a	 Trinitarian	 Protestant	
nation”.21	Perry	Miller	 (1905-1963),	 however,	 as	 discussed	 by	 Howe,	 refers	 to	 “the	 representative	
quality”	 [italics	 by	Miller]	 of	 the	New	England	mind,	 arguing	 that	 “the	 intellectual	 development	of	
New	England	from	its	beginning	through	the	early	part	of	the	nineteenth	century	provides	historians	
with	a	‘laboratory’	for	the	study	of	‘the	relation	of	thought	or	ideas	to	community	experience’”.22	
	
1.2	 American	Swedenborgianism	and	the	New	Church	in	Antebellum	America	
Swedenborgianism	–	both	in	its	institutionalized	form	and	as	a	philosophical	‘school’	–	responded	to	
the	reform	sentiment	that	dominated	American	 intellectual	 life	 in	the	1830s,	1840s	and	1850s.23	In	
1784,	Swedenborg’s	thought	had	been	brought	to	the	United	States	by	James	Glen,	a	planter	from	
Demerara.24	In	 Philadelphia,	 New	 York,	 Baltimore,	 Boston	 and	 later	 Cincinnati,	 reading	 groups	 of	
Swedenborg’s	 works	 were	 formed,	 attracting	 socially	 and	 economically	 prominent	 citizens.25	The	
Swedenborgianism	 that	 sprouted	 from	 these	 early	 communities	 was	 not	 quite	 identical	 with	 the	
theories	and	doctrines,	as	formulated	by	Swedenborg.	Rather,	it	was	“Swedenborg	Americanized	to	
fit	 both	 the	 cultural	 and	 personal	 needs	 of	 a	 literate	 and	 often	wealthy	 segment	 of	 the	American	
middle	class”.26		
	 In	 Boston,	 a	 so-called	 Swedenborgian	 ‘New	 Church’	 was	 established	 involving	 a	 group	 of	
Harvard	 Divinity	 School	 students	 that	 also	 included	 Harvard	 professor	 of	 Law	 Theophilus	 Parsons	
(1797-1882),	and	Sampson	Reed	(1800-1880)	whom	we	will	meet	later	on.	Although	the	New	Church	
attracted	but	a	small	following,	many	Americans	came	into	contact	with	Swedenborg’s	works.	In	his																																																									20	Prothero,	‘Introduction’,	in:	Carole	Tonkinson	(ed.),	Big	Sky	Mind:	Buddhism	and	the	Beat	Generation,	6.	21	Howe,	The	Unitarian	Conscience.	Harvard	Moral	Philosophy,	1805-1861,	6.	22	Ibid.,	22.	23	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	1.	24	Located	in	the	Guianas,	Demerara	(Dutch:	Demerary)	at	the	time	was	a	Dutch	colony.	When	in	1781	the	Dutch	decided	to	support	the	American	revolutionaries	against	the	British,	the	colony	came	under	British	occupation	from	1796	to	1802.	In	1814	the	colony	was	formally	ceded	to	Britain	by	the	Netherlands.	25	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	45.	26	Ibid.,	50.	
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lifetime	Swedenborg	published	over	one	hundred	books,	all	of	them	written	in	Latin.	The	translation	
of	 these	 works	 into	 English	 and	 their	 subsequent	 publication	 in	 the	 United	 States	 was	 extremely	
uneven.	For	the	most	part	the	early	works	on	mechanics,	metallurgy	and	cosmological	theory	were	
ignored.	Among	the	scientific	works	only	the	Economy	of	the	Animal	Kingdom,	in	which		Swedenborg	
presents	 a	 physical	 theory	 of	 evolution	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 account	 for	 the	 variety	 of	 animal	 life	 on	
earth,	was	well	known	to	 the	American	public.	Of	his	 theological	writings,	by	 far	 the	most	popular	
was	Heaven	and	Hell	(1758);	other	works	that	were	readily	available	and	widely	read	were	the	first	
volume	 of	 the	 Arcana	 Cœlestia	 (1748)	 and	 the	 last	 comprehensive	 summary	 of	 Swedenborg’s	
thought,	 The	 True	 Christian	 Religion	 (1771).27	Consequently,	 despite	 his	 “sometimes	 colorful	 but	
generally	 rather	 flat	 style	 [that]	 is	off-putting	 to	many	readers”28,	over	 time	Swedenborg’s	writings	
affected	 a	 diverse	 group	 of	 Americans	 from	 different	 social	 strata:	 from	 an	 elite	 group	 of	 New	
England	intellectuals	to	thousands	of	common	workers.29	
	 Central	 to	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophy	 is	 the	 so-called	 ‘Doctrine	 of	 Correspondences’	 which	
posits	 an	 ontology	 of	 relations	 between	 the	 things	 or	 concepts	 in	 the	 spiritual	 realm	 and	 their	
manifestations	in	the	natural	world	or	physical	realm.		Faivre	explains:		
	
Swedenborg	 presented	 his	 visions	 using	 images	 and	 figures	 that	 constitute	 a	 type	 of	
descriptive,	 even	 realistic,	 geography	 of	 the	 celestial	 spheres,	 of	 the	 ‘spiritual’	 worlds.	 His	
work	 greatly	 contributed	 to	 disseminate	 to	 a	 wide	 audience	 the	 idea	 of	 universal	
correspondences	 that,	 from	Nature	 to	 humanity	 and	 from	 humanity	 to	 God,	 appear	 as	 an	
indefinite	 series	 of	 intermediaries.	 In	 the	 natural	 world,	 any	 object,	 even	 the	 most	 minor,	
‘corresponds’	 to	 something	 that	 partakes	 of	 a	 higher	 order	 of	 reality,	 without	 solution	 of	
continuity.30		
	
American	Swedenborgians	focused	meticulously	on	learning	the	meaning	of	these	‘correspondences’	
that	were	 supposed	 to	 assist	 in	 uncovering	 deeper	meanings	 in	 the	 Bible.	 Their	most	 remarkable	
achievement	 in	 this	 respect	were	 the	Dictionaries	of	Correspondences	 of	which	nine	editions	were	
produced	between	1841	and	1891.31		
	
																																																								27	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	21n31.	28	Faivre,	Western	Esotericism:	A	Concise	History,	55.	29	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	23.	30	Faivre,	Western	Esotericism,	55.	31	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	65n45.	
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1.3	 Swedenborg	and	the	emergence	of	Transcendentalism	
Harvard	 had	 rendered	 Boston	 and	 environs	 into	 a	 hotspot	 of	 Unitarianism,	 forcing	 orthodox	
Calvinism	 into	 retreat.	 In	 due	 course,	 however,	 the	 rational	 faith	 of	 the	 Harvard	 Unitarians	 was	
contested	by	the	Transcendentalism	of	Ralph	Waldo	Emerson	and	Theodore	Parker	(1810-1860).	On	
July	 15,	 1838	 Emerson,	 having	 recently	 left	 the	 Unitarian	 ministry,	 urged	 Harvard	 Divinity	 School	
graduates	to	turn	their	attention	away	from	‘historical	Christianity’	and	‘acquaint	men	at	first	hand	
with	Deity’.32	For,	Unitarian	ministers,	according	to	Emerson,	were	‘corpse-cold’,	and	Unitarianism’s	
Divinity	School	was	an	‘ice-house’.33		
	 Extensive	 scholarship	 has	 dedicated	 itself	 to	 the	 uncovering	 of	 the	 influences	 that	 shaped	
Transcendentalism.34	This	 thesis	 is	 too	 short	 to	 present	 an	 overview	 of	 these	 debates.	 However,	
general	 consensus	 finds	 that	 the	 Transcendentalists	 were	 at	 least	 influenced	 by	 the	 British	
Romanticism	of	Samuel	Taylor	Coleridge	(1772-1834),	by	Scottish	philosopher	Thomas	Carlyle	(1795-
1881)	–	particularly	his	ideas	on	‘the	heroic	in	history’	that	strongly	influenced	Emerson	as	we	shall	
see	–,	and	by	French	philosopher	Victor	Cousin	(1792-1867)	and	his	theory	of	‘eclecticism’	in	relation	
to	 the	 immediacy	 of	 ‘truth	 by	 intuition’	 –	 which	 in	my	 opinion	 amounts	 to	 a	 theory	 of	 ‘anything	
goes’.		
	 From	a	philosophical	angle,	arguably,	 I	 find	that	Transcendentalism	can	be	characterized	by	
1)	 a	 positivist,	 intuitionist	 epistemology,	 2)	 an	 ethic	 based	 on	 individualism	 and	 self-reliance,	 and	
3)	monistic	 idealistic	 metaphysics.	 By	 way	 of	 elaboration	 I	 argue	 that,	 if	 we	 approach	
Transcendentalism	through	Immanuel	Kant’s	‘transcendental	anthropology’	–	Kant’s	main	questions	
involving	 the	 theory	of	human	nature	–	 firstly,	we	 find	an	epistemology	 that	 combines	a	Comtean	
positivist	position	(stipulating	that	information	derived	from	sensory	experience,	interpreted	through	
reason	and	logic,	is	the	exclusive	source	of	all	authoritative	knowledge)	with	an	intuitionist	position	
that	 asserts	 that	 divine	 truths	 can	 be	 known	 intuitively.	 Secondly,	 Transcendentalism’s	 moral	
philosophy	is	based	on	individualism	and	self-reliance,	especially	in	opposition	to	religious	authority;	
no	other	moral	standard	than	the	individual’s	own	shall	guide	his	actions.	Lastly,	fundamental	ideas	
on	the	nature	of	reality	are	formulated	as	an	ontological	doctrine	of	divine	immanence,	based	on	an	
amalgam	of	monistic	metaphysics	and	philosophical	idealism.	
																																																								32	McKanan,	Unitarianism,	Universalism,	and	Unitarian	Universalism,	17.	33	Prothero,	‘Introduction’,	in:	Carole	Tonkinson	(ed.),	Big	Sky	Mind:	Buddhism	and	the	Beat	Generation,	6.	34	The	fact	that	Transcendentalism	has	inspired	extensive	scholarship	can	be	partly	attributed	to	the	fact	that	Emerson	and	his	Transcendentalists	figure	rather	prominently	in	the	canon	of	American	literature.	The	question	whether	Transcendentalism	should	be	considered	a	literary	rather	than	a	religious	movement	has	been	addressed	by	Miller.	In	his	book	The	Transcendentalists:	An	Anthology	(1950),	Miller	argues	that	American	Transcendentalism	as	an	influential	school	of	thought	among	New	England	writers	in	the	mid-1800s,	was	primarily	a	‘religious	demonstration’.	
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	 Although	 the	Transcendentalist	worldview	would	on	 the	outside	 “seem	 like	a	mass	of	wild	
opinions”35,	Frothingham	informs	us	that	Transcendentalism	“had	a	creed	and	a	definite	one”.36		
	
It	was	something	more	than	a	reaction	against	formalism	and	tradition,	though	it	took	that	
form.	 It	was	more	 than	a	 reaction	against	Puritan	Orthodoxy,	 though	 in	part	 it	was	 that.	 It	
was	 in	 a	 very	 small	 degree	 due	 to	 study	 of	 the	 ancient	 pantheists,	 of	 Plato	 and	 the	
Alexandrians,	of	Plutarch,	Seneca	and	Epetictus,	though	one	or	two	of	the	leaders	had	drunk	
deeply	from	these	sources.	Transcendentalism	was	a	distinct	philosophical	system.	Practically	
it	was	an	assertion	of	the	 inalienable	worth	of	man;	theoretically	 it	was	an	assertion	of	the	
immanence	of	divinity	 in	 instinct,	 the	 transference	of	 supernatural	attributes	 to	 the	natural	
constitution	of	mankind.37		
	
Hence,	 as	 a	movement	 for	 religious	 reform,	 running	 through	Transcendentalism	was	 “the	belief	 in	
the	 Living	 God	 in	 the	 Soul,	 faith	 in	 immediate	 inspiration,	 in	 boundless	 possibility,	 and	 in	
unimaginable	good”.38	
	 In	his	analysis	‘From	Edwards	to	Emerson’	(1940),	Miller	finds	that	Transcendentalism	has	its	
roots	deep	 in	 the	pietistic	 strain	of	New	England	Puritanism.39	Howe	posits	 that	Transcendentalists	
wanted	 to	 ‘reinject	 a	 sense	 of	 piety	 into	 the	 old	 religion’	 without	 restoring	 the	 doctrines	 of	 total	
depravity	 and	 original	 sin.40	In	 order	 to	 succeed,	 they	 needed	 a	 new	 sense	 of	 religious	 spirituality	
that,	Silver	argues,	was	partly	provided	by	Swedenborg.41	Or	more	accurately	put:	provided	through	
Transcendentalists’	contacts	with	American	Swedenborgians.		
	 Both	 Swedenborgians	 and	 Unitarians	 were	 an	 upper	 middle	 class,	 elite	 group	 of	 rational,	
religious	 liberals	 for	 whom	 Swedenborg’s	 teachings	 provided	 answers	 to	 the	 prevailing	 crisis	 in	
society.	 After	 all,	 Swedenborg	 was	 also	 a	 thorough	 anti-Calvinist,	 criticizing	 a	 variety	 of	 doctrines	
from	predestination	 to	 infant	 damnation	 to	 the	 Trinity.	 Also,	 Swedenborg	 saw	heaven	 and	 hell	 as	
mind	 states,	open	 to	all	who	 sustained	 their	 love	 to	God	and	 to	 their	 fellow	men,	 independent	of	
church	affiliation.	Moreover,	“Swedenborg’s	dismissal	of	external	miracles,	while	preserving	room	for	
																																																								35	Frothingham,	Transcendentalism	in	New	England,	137.	36	Ibid.,	135.	37	Ibid.,	136.	38	Ibid.,	137.	39	Miller,	‘From	Edwards	to	Emerson’,	in:	Lawrence	Buell	(ed.),	Ralph	Waldo	Emerson:	A	Collection	of	
Critical	Essays.	Englewood	Cliffs,	NJ:	Prentice	Hall,	1993.	40	Howe,	The	Unitarian	Conscience,	1970.	41	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	105n46	
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indirect	 internal	 experiences	 of	 the	 divine,	 jibed	 with	 Transcendentalist	 intuitions”. 42 	Silver	
elaborates:			
	
The	 Transcendentalists	 believed	 that	 Swedenborg’s	 doctrines	 supported	 their	 own	 idealist	
philosophy.	 Swedenborg,	 then,	 was	 only	 one	more	 weapon	 in	 the	 Transcendentalist	 revolt	
against	Lockean	sensationalism.	Because	he	supported	a	spiritual	view	of	reality	and	stressed	
the	 ethical	 dimension	 of	 the	 natural	 life,	 his	 philosophy	 was	 perfectly	 adapted	 for	
Transcendentalists	 like	 Christopher	 Pearse	 Cranch,	 Margaret	 Fuller	 and	 Ralph	 Waldo	
Emerson.43	
	
Summarizing	we	find	that	Transcendentalism	‘borrowed’	from	the	Americanized	Swedenborgianism	
of	 the	 era	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘correspondences’,	 a	 turn	 towards	 spirituality,	 and	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	
ethical	responsibility	of	the	individual	man.		
	
*	*	*	*	*	
	
On	May	20,	1838,	two	months	before	his	famous	Divinity	School	Address,	Emerson’s	Transcendental	
Club	 gathered	 in	 the	 old	 parsonage	 of	 Unitarian	 minister	 Caleb	 Stetson	 (1793-1870)	 in	 Medford,	
Massachusetts,	 in	 order	 to	 discuss	 the	 topic	 of	 ‘mysticism’.	 Besides	 Emerson	 and	 Stetson,	 notable	
Transcendentalists	 like	 Theodore	 Parker,	 Jones	 Very	 (1813-1880),	 George	 Ripley	 (1802-1880),	 and	
Amos	 Bronson	 Alcott	 (1799-1888)	 were	 present.	 Schmidt	 marks	 this	 occasion	 as	 the	 birth	 of	
mysticism	in	America.44	But	was	it?	Earlier	we	have	seen	how	Swedenborgianism	manifested	itself	in	
antebellum	 America.	 Now	 we	 move	 to	 Emerson’s	 encounter	 with	 Swedenborg’s	 ideas,	 and	 the	
circumstances	that	led	to	the	conception	of	his	essay	‘Swedenborg;	or,	the	Mystic’	in	Representative	
Men.		
	
1.4	 Introducing	Emerson’s	Representative	Men	
Representative	Men,	published	in	1850,	was	conceived	as	a	result	of	a	series	of	biographical	lectures	
that	 Emerson	 gave	 in	 1835	 and	 1836.	 The	 first	 essay	 discusses	 the	 role	 played	 by	 ‘great	men’	 in	
society;	the	six	following	essays	describe	the	virtues	of	the	men	Emerson	considered	emblematic	of	a	
particular	virtue	or	function.	His	choice	of	characters	are	Plato,	or	the	Philosopher;	Swedenborg,	or	
the	Mystic;	Montaigne,	or	the	Skeptic;	Shakespeare,	or	the	Poet;	Napoleon,	or	the	Man	of	the	World;																																																									42	Schmidt,	Restless	Souls,	45-46.	43	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	89.	44	Schmidt,	Restless	Souls,	29.	
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and	Goethe,	or	the	Writer	–	presented	in	the	book	in	that	order.	Of	the	six	representatives	Napoleon	
and	Goethe	are	understood	to	 impersonate	specific	historical	periods,	whereas	Plato,	Swedenborg,	
Montaigne	and	Shakespeare	represent	‘timeless’	men.	Of	the	latter	four,	Plato	and	Swedenborg	are	
understood	to	be	representatives	of	men	in	search	of	‘ultimate	spiritual	truth’.45		
	 The	 reception	 of	 Representative	 Men	 at	 the	 time	 was	 not	 wholly	 favourable.	 Cornelius	
Conway	–	C.C.	–	Felton	(1807-1862),	at	the	time	professor	of	Greek	literature	and	later	president	of	
Harvard	 University,	 described	 Emerson’s	 essays	 as	 “attempts	 to	 set	 forth	 qualities	 of	 character	
[rather]	than	to	represent	characters”.	“They	are	like	the	study	of	an	artist,	who	has	painted	portions	
of	 his	 picture	 on	 separate	 bits	 of	 canvas,	 and	 then,	 instead	 working	 them	 together	 under	 the	
inspiration	 of	 a	 general	 idea,	 stitches	 the	 sundered	 members	 as	 chance	 may	 arrange	 them”.46	In	
1929,	Clarence	Paul	Hotson	 found	 that	 for	his	essay	 ‘Swedenborg’	 in	Representative	Men	Emerson	
relied	 heavily	 on	 ‘the	 first	 notable	 biography’	 of	 Swedenborg,	 namely	 Life	 of	 Swedenborg	 by	
Nathaniel	Hobart	that	had	appeared	in	1831.	He	also	demonstrates	how	Emerson	took	excerpts	from	
J.J.	 Garth	 Wilkinson’s	 article	 in	 the	 Penny	 Cyclopaedia,	 XXIII,	 39.47	At	 the	 time,	 apparently,	 the	
‘borrowing’	had	gone	unnoticed.	For,	in	general	the	critical	reception	of	the	book	in	the	early	1850s	
was	limited,	and	the	criticism	voiced	was	mostly	from	a	sectarian	perspective.48		
	 In	view	of	Emerson’s	vast	literary	achievements	Representative	Men	seems	superficially	to	be	
a	minor	work	–	of	biographical	 rather	 than	philosophical	 interest.	However,	not	 surprisingly,	 Kurtz	
finds	that	Representative	Men	is	“one	of	Emerson’s	most	central	statements,	and	represents	a	larger	
body	 of	 his	 lecture	 and	 essay	material	 than	 perhaps	 any	 other	 single	 subject”.49	Kurtz	 argues	 that	
Representative	 Men	 presents	 the	 whole	 of	 Emerson’s	 thought	 from	 a	 particular	 point	 of	 view,	
namely	his	concept	of	the	nature	and	function	of	great	men.	Moreover,	Kurtz	posits,	Emerson’s	idea	
of	the	hero	is	essential	to	understanding	Emerson’s	general	thought.50		
	 Kurtz	has	analyzed	Emerson’s	 ideas	on	 the	nature	and	 function	of	great	men	 in	 relation	 to	
God	 and	 to	 society,	 showing	 these	 can	 be	 related	 to	 the	 important	 influences	 of	 aforementioned	
Victor	 Cousin	 and	 Thomas	Carlyle.	However,	with	 respect	 to	 the	 literary	 influences	 that	may	have	
shaped	 Emerson’s	 theory	 of	 the	 hero,	 Kurtz	 emphasizes	 that	 Emerson	 “not	 only	 borrowed	 but																																																									45	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	16.	According	to	Kurtz,	Montaigne	is	the	personification	of	‘Man	probing	as	active	intellect’,	while	Shakespeace	is	‘Man	reacting	to	the	afflications	and	circumstances	of	mundane	existence’.		46	Felton,	Review	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	522.	47	Hotson,	Emerson’s	Biographical	Sources	for	‘Swedenborg’,	45.	The	extent	to	which	Emerson	copied	and	rephrased	parts	of	Hobart’s	and	Wilkinson’s	work	would	by	today’s	measure	probably	lead	to	an	accusion	of	plagiarism	–	although	Emerson,	according	to	Hotson,	“in	making	Hobart’s	and	Wilkinson’s	statements	his	own	improved	considerably	upon	their	style”.		48	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	417.	49	Ibid.,	21.	50	Ibid.,	10-11.	
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assimilated	material,	so	that	it	became	indistinguishable	from	his	own	thought”.	He	was	“an	intuitive,	
self-developing	and	 rather	undisciplined	mind,	with	a	 strong	bias	of	his	own”,	and	“not	 concerned	
with	other	men’s	 systems	of	 ideas”.	Furthermore,	 in	 tracing	sources	 in	Emerson’s	 reading,	 there	 is	
the	problem	of	“determining	whether	in	fact	he	read	given	passages”.51		
	
1.5	 Sources	for	the	essay	‘Swedenborg,	or	the	Mystic’		
Kurtz	identifies	three	sources	through	which	Emerson	became	familiar	with	Swedenborg’s	doctrines:	
1)	the	writings	of	Sampson	Reed	and	other	leaders	of	the	Swedenborgian	movement	in	Boston	from	
1820	 to	 1840;	 2)	 the	 book	The	 True	Messiah	by	Guillaume	Oegger	 (1790-1853),	 a	 French	Catholic	
priest	turned	Swedenborgian;	and	3)	the	writings	of	Swedenborg	himself.		
	 Reed	was	a	Harvard	student,	graduating	several	years	before	Emerson.	Instead	of	attending	
the	Divinity	School,	Reed	found	himself	attracted	by	the	Swedenborgian	New	Church	in	Boston,	and	
became	of	its	main	figures	through	his	contributions	to	its	periodical	The	New	Jerusalem	Magazine.	
Reed	 also	 belonged	 to	 Emerson’s	 Transcendentalist	 Club.	 Emerson	 was	 particularly	 influenced	 by	
Reed’s	book	Observations	on	the	Growth	of	the	Mind	that	was	published	in	1826.52		
	 Through	Reed,	Emerson	was	introduced	to	Swedenborgian	doctrine,	a	fact	that	Emerson	was	
unaware	of	for	years.	Although	Reed	never	claimed	to	be	anything	but	an	interpreter	of	Swedenborg,	
Emerson	regarded	Reed	as	a	genius	in	his	own	right	and	an	original	thinker.53	In	fact,	Emerson	held	
Reed	in	such	high	esteem	that	when	he	finished	his	essay	‘Nature’	in	1836,	he	compared	his	work	to	
Reed’s	 Growth	 of	 the	 Mind,	 as	 if	 this	 had	 been	 his	 model	 and	 source	 of	 inspiration.54	By	 1838,	
however,	Reed	had	fallen	from	favour.	Emerson	had	begun	reading	Swedenborg’s	works	first	hand,	
and	realized	that	Reed	was	voicing	Swedenborgian	ideas.	The	discovery	apparently	was	much	to	his	
chagrin.	 As	 Reed	 and	 Emerson	 grew	 apart,	 so	 did	 their	 respective	 Swedenborgian	 and	
Transcendentalist	communities.	
	 In	1835	Emerson	discovered	the	work	of	Guillaume	Caspar	Lencroy	Oegger,	a	French	Catholic	
priest	who	 became	 a	 Swedenborgian	 around	 1826.	 In	 1829	Oegger	 published	 Le	 Vrai	Messie.	 The	
manuscript	of	an	English	translation	by	Elizabeth	Palmer	Peabody	(1804-1894)	in	1835	circulated	in	
the	Transcendentalist	milieu.	Emerson’s	interest	in	Oegger	predominated	during	the	period	in	which	
he	worked	on	‘Nature’	–	it	is	no	coincidence,	therefore,	that	the	‘French	philosopher’	that	Emerson	
mentions	in	‘Nature’	refers	to	Oegger.55																																																									51	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	66-67.	52	Ibid.,	216.	53	Ibid.,	217.	54	Ibid.,	218.	55	Ibid.,	225.	
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	 Recapitulating,	 Kurtz	 demonstrates	 that	 as	 early	 as	 1821	 Emerson	 was	 familiar	 with	
Swedenborg’s	central	ideas	through	Reed.	However,	Emerson	did	not	read	any	of	Swedenborg’s	own	
works	until	1835,	 the	same	year	 in	which	he	discovered	Oegger.	“Up	to	1836,	Emerson	appears	 to	
have	 derived	 his	 knowledge	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 doctrines	 almost	 wholly	 from	 secondary	 sources”.56	
Moreover,	 Emerson	 never	 read	 anything	 from	 Swedenborg	 in	 the	 Latin	 in	which	 he	wrote	 it.	 This	
raises	 the	 question	 to	 what	 extent	 Emerson	 was	 able	 to	 distinguish	 between	 Swedenborg’s	 own	
ideas	and	the	interpretations	by	Reed,	Oegger,	and	members	of	the	New	Jerusalem	Church.		
	 As	from	1841,	while	getting	deeply	 into	Swedenborg’s	own	writings57,	Emerson	got	an	ever	
lower	opinion	of	the	Swede	–	first	he	degraded	him	to	the	level	of	‘Moses	and	the	Calvinists’	which	in	
view	of	Emerson’s	criticism	of	Calvinist	orthodoxy	is	rather	low,	next	he	accused	him	of	bigotry	and	
being	nothing	but	‘a	poor	Lutheran’,	until	finally	he	called	him	a	‘quack’	who	offered	‘mere	people’s	
theology’	–	literalist,	pragmatical,	and	‘a	little	narrow’.	Ultimately,	Swedenborg	–	in	Emerson’s	words	
–	“narrows	the	Scripture	of	nature	to	the	wretched	answers	of	the	Swedish	catechism”.58		
	 But,	what	triggered	Emerson’s	increasing	resentment	of	Swedenborg?	And	why,	if	his	opinion	
of	Swedenborg	was	so	low,	did	he	choose	him	as	the	archetypical	‘mystic’	in	his	Representative	Men?	
The	answer	is	found	in	two	objections	and	a	match.		
	
1.6	 Emerson’s	dilemma:	two	objections	and	a	match		
So,	why	did	Emerson	choose	Swedenborg	as	one	of	his	‘representative	men’?	Silver	explains	rather	
thinly:	 “Of	all	 the	men	 in	 the	 recent	ages,	only	Swedenborg	 stood	eminently	 for	 the	 translation	of	
nature	 into	 thought”.59	And,	 “In	 Emerson’s	 view,	 Swedenborg	was	 a	 poet	 of	 the	 soul.	 He	was	 the	
master	 of	 metaphor	 and	 analogy”.60	Apparently,	 Silver	 explains	 the	 choice	 for	 Swedenborg	 in	 his	
mode	of	expression.	But	what	does	 it	mean?	What	 is	a	 ‘poet-translator’	–	and	of	 the	 ‘natural’	 into	
the	 ‘spiritual’,	 at	 that?	 And	 how	 does	 this	 relate	 to	 ‘mysticism’	 that	 Swedenborg	 is	 supposed	 to	
represent?	 Are	 ‘mystics’	 primarily	 engaged	 in	 poetic	 translations?	 Somehow,	 Silver’s	 statement	
seems	to	raise	more	questions	than	it	answers.	
In	 Kurtz	 we	 find	 a	 more	 elaborate	 explanation.	 Arguably,	 Emerson	 became	 interested	 in	
Swedenborg	in	order	to	solve	his	problem	of	the	relation	between	the	domains	of	the	moral	and	the	
material.	We	have	 seen	 that	 Swedenborg	 connects	 the	natural	 and	 spiritual	 realms	–	 the	material																																																									56	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	230.	57	Emerson	carefully	read	and	annotated	Swedenborg’s	The	True	Christian	Religion	(1771),	Divine	Love	
and	Wisdom,	Economy	of	the	Animal	Kingdom,	the	first	volumes	of	the	Arcana	Coelestia	(1748)	and	
Apocalypse	Revealed.	In:	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	p21n31.	58	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	233-236.	59	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	103.	60	Ibid.,	98.	
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world	 and	 the	 moral	 sense	 –	 through	 his	 doctrine	 of	 correspondences.	 In	 Swedenborg	 Emerson	
found	someone	“who	could	speak	with	authority	of	 scientific	 law,	while	making	 it	explain	a	higher	
law”.61	In	fact,	his	 interest	 in	science	distinguishes	Emerson’s	preoccupation	with	Swedenborg	from	
his	 equally	 strong	 interest	 in	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 Plato.	 For,	 in	 Kurtz’s	 words:	 “Plato	 arrived	 at	
transcendentalism	 through	 observation	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 thought,	 Swedenborg	 through	 the	 laws	 of	
things,	and	Emerson	was	interested	in	both”.62	
	 However,	while	Emerson	thought	of	Swedenborg	as	a	scientist,	he	also	saw	in	him	a	mystic	in	
the	tradition	of	Jacob	Böhme	(1575-1624)	–	including	his	own	language	of	‘Swedenborgese’.63	Kurtz	
elaborates	–	by	comparing	Emerson’s	approach	to	Swedenborg	and	to	Plato:		
	
Mysticism	 appears	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 Swedenborg	 had	 perceived	 the	 truth	 of	 his	 basic	
proposition	by	intuition	and	defended	it	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	a	revelation.	But	Emerson	
shows	more	interest	 in	the	doctrine	than	in	Swedenborg’s	mystic	experiences	as	such.	As	he	
presents	them,	Plato	and	Swedenborg	gave	the	same	message:	reality	is	one	and	is	spiritual	
in	its	nature.	The	two	men	differ	in	that	Swedenborg	simply	asserted	the	validity	of	his	insight,	
illustrating	 it	 with	 fantastic	 stories	 of	 trips	 to	 heaven	 and	 hell	 and	 with	 almost	 equally	
fantastic	elucidations	of	natural	phenomena,	which	Emerson	gravely	applauds;	while	Plato,	
who	 as	 Emerson	 noted	 said	 the	 same	 thing,	 substantiated	 his	 perception	 by	 logic	 and	
analysis,	which	Emerson	also	applauds	as	‘the	science	of	sciences’.64		
	
In	 other	 words,	 Swedenborg	 and	 Plato	 both	 arrive	 at	 defining	 and	 explaining	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
material	 realm	 in	 terms	 of	 –	 and	 in	 accordance	with	 –	 the	 ‘spiritual’	 or	 the	moral	 sentiment.	 The	
difference	is	that	Plato	arrives	at	his	conclusions	through	reasoning,	whereas	Swedenborg’s	insights	
are	 the	 result	 of	mystic,	 intuitive	 experiences.	 And,	 as	 Swedenborg’s	mystical	 experiences	 appear	
similar	 to	those	of	Böhme,	Emerson	declares	 it	a	match.	Hence,	Plato	 is	decreed	the	 ‘philosopher’,	
whereas	Swedenborg	gets	the	label	‘mystic’.		
	 But,	what	had	triggered	Emerson’s	resistance	toward	Swedenborg	in	the	first	place?	The	first	
objection	 deals	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophy	 challenged	 Emerson’s	 conception	 of	
reality.	 Silver	 states:	 “For	 Emerson,	 unlike	 for	 Swedenborg,	 a	 hierarchical	 universe	 could	 not	 be	
reconciled	with	an	ontological	monism,	for	if	he	accepted	the	existence	of	a	hierarchical	universe,	he	
																																																								61	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	225.	62	Ibid.,	226.	63	Ibid.,	233.	64	Ibid.,	244.	
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would	 have	 to	 sacrifice	 his	 own	 belief	 in	 immediate	 intuition	 and	 direct	 experience”.65	In	my	 own	
words:	Swedenborg	in	his	writings	had	postulated	a	spiritual	realm,	 inhabited	by	angels	and	spirits.	
However,	his	basic	concept	of	reality	was	one	of	ontological	monism,	much	like	Platonic	realism.	The	
Swedenborgian	universe	is	a	hierarchical	construct	with	various	spiritual	layers	and	levels	of	heaven	
and	hell.	For	Emerson,	however,	the	entire	universe	is	contained	in	the	natural	realm;	his	concept	of	
reality	necessarily	excludes	the	postulated	existence	of	a	spiritual	or	celestial	realm.	Moreover,	the	
idea	 of	 a	 hierarchical	 universe	 threatened	 Emerson’s	 belief	 in	 immediate	 intuition	 and	 direct	
experience.	 For	 Emerson	 the	divine	was	 found	within,	 in	man’s	 inner	 spirit	 –	 to	be	 found	 through	
intuition	 and	 to	 be	 experienced	 in	 man’s	 inner	 moral	 sense.	 Swedenborg’s	 ontological	 monism	
clashed	 with	 Emerson’s	 epistemology	 of	 immediate	 intuition	 and	 self-reliance.	 Even	 worse,	 the	
postulate	of	intermediaries	between	man	and	God,	between	the	natural	and	the	spiritual	or	moral,	
would	 reduce	 man’s	 sense	 of	 individual	 responsibility. 66 	Evidently,	 this	 issue	 raises	 immediate	
questions	with	 respect	 to	 the	 position	 of	 Christ	 in	 Emerson’s	 philosophical	 system.	Unfortunately,	
the	scope	of	this	paper	does	not	allow	for	further	elaboration.		
	 The	 second	 objection	 involves	 Emerson’s	 view	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 thought	 as	 ‘rigid’.	 Silver	
points	to	a	study	by	Sherman	Paul	that	traces	the	influence	of	Swedenborg	on	Emerson.	In	Emerson’s	
Angle	of	Vision:	Man	and	Nature	in	the	American	Experience	(Cambridge,	MA,	1952)	Paul	argues	that	
“while	 Emerson	 accepted	 the	 nature/spirit	 correspondence	 of	 Swedenborg,	 he	 objected	 to	 the	
rigidity	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 thought.”	 Silver	 observes	 that	 Paul,	 although	 he	 has	 not	 read	 any	 of	
Swedenborg’s	works,	accepts	Emerson’s	view	of	the	Swede,	whereas	he	[Silver]	tends	not	to.	Silver	
questions	 Emerson’s	 qualification	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 thought	 as	 ‘rigid’,	 for	 he	 finds	 Swedenborg	 far	
more	 flexible	 and	organic	 in	 his	 correspondences	 than	either	 Emerson	or	 Paul	 indicates.	 So,	 Silver	
argues,	“The	important	question	is,	why	did	Emerson	misrepresent	Swedenborg	on	this	point?”67	If	I	
understand	 Silver’s	 argument	 correctly,	 he	 finds	 that,	 while	 Emerson	 accepted	 the	 content	 of	
Swedenborg’s	 thought	 on	 correspondences,	 he	 objects	 to	 the	 ‘rigidity’	 of	 it.	 But	what	 does	 ‘rigid’	
mean?	 That	 Swedenborg’s	 correspondences	 theory	 was	 complete,	 consistent	 –	 uncompromising	
perhaps,	to	the	point	of	leaving	little	space	for	‘manipulation’?	And	how	do	you	reject	the	‘rigidity’	of	
a	 thought	 system	that	otherwise	qualifies	as	valid?	Needless	 to	 say,	 there	are	excellent	 studies	on	
Emerson	and	his	intellectual	development	that	admittedly	I	have	not	read,	and	it	is	not	my	intention	
to	question	his	character	or	his	 literary	or	philosophical	achievements.	However,	 the	question	that	
Silver	raises	–	and	I	echo	here	–	remains	a	valid	one:	why	did	Emerson	misrepresent	Swedenborg?		
																																																									65	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	111.	66	Ibid.,	112.	67	Ibid.,	88-89n1.	
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1.7	 Reviewing	Emerson	and	his	essay,	using	quotations	as	illustrations	
Studies	on	Emerson	have	 shown	 that	while	he	was	very	negative	about	Swedenborg	 in	his	private	
journals,	 in	 his	 lectures	 and	 essays	 he	 gave	 praise.	 Silver	 notes	 that	 “it	 was	 almost	 as	 if	 Emerson	
presented	 one	 public	 view	 of	 Swedenborg	 that	 supported	 his	 own	 position	 and	 another	 less	
flattering	private	appraisal	of	the	Swedish	mystic”.68	After	reviewing	some	of	Emerson’s	sources	and	
development	in	relation	to	Representative	Men,	I	concur	that	Silver’s	observation	seems	accurate.		
	 There	 is	 a	 strong	 ambivalence	 to	 Emerson’s	 portrayal	 of	 Swedenborg	 as	 the	 ‘mystic’	 in	
Representative	 Men.	 At	 times	 Emerson	 saw	 Swedenborg	 as	 a	 poet,	 an	 engineer,	 a	 theoretical	
scientist,	 a	 Calvinistic	 theologian,	 a	 transcendental	 philosopher	 with	 extraordinary	 synthesizing	
capacities	like	Plato,	and	a	mystic.	“In	the	essay	Emerson	does	not	present	him	primarily	in	his	title	
role	 of	 mystic,	 but	 rather	 as	 scientist,	 theologian,	 or	 writer	 of	 bad	 fables.	 The	 essay	 is	 chiefly	 a	
critique	of	Swedenborg’s	doctrines,	and	an	attempt	to	place	him	in	relation	to	other	great	intellects	–	
particularly	 to	 Plato,	 in	 the	metaphysical	 realm,	 and,	 in	 the	 physical	world,	 to	 the	 great	 scientists	
from	Aristotle	to	Descartes	and	Linnaeus”.69		
	 Emerson	credits	 Swedenborg	with	 the	development	of	a	moral	philosophy	 that	adheres	 to	
natural	 theology,	naming	him	 ‘the	 last	 Father	 in	 the	Church’.	 Swedenborg	promotes	 religion	as	an	
ethical	way	of	life	–	much	to	Emerson’s	liking,	as	the	following	quote	illustrates.		
	
Swedenborg	 styles	himself,	 in	 the	 title-page	of	his	books,	 ‘Servant	of	 the	 Lord	 Jesus	Christ’;	
and	by	force	of	intellect,	and	in	effect,	he	is	the	last	Father	in	the	Church,	and	is	not	likely	to	
have	a	successor.	No	wonder	that	his	depth	of	ethical	wisdom	should	give	him	influence	as	a	
teacher.	To	 the	withered	traditional	Church,	yielding	dry	catechisms,	he	 let	 in	nature	again,	
and	the	worshipper,	escaping	from	the	vestry	of	verbs	and	texts,	is	surprised	to	find	himself	a	
party	to	the	whole	of	his	religion.	His	religion	thinks	for	him,	and	is	of	universal	application.	
He	turns	it	on	every	side;	it	fits	every	part	of	life,	interprets	and	dignifies	every	circumstance.	
Instead	of	a	religion	which	visited	him	diplomatically	three	or	four	times,	–	when	he	was	born,	
when	he	married,	when	he	fell	sick,	and	when	he	died,	and	for	the	rest	never	interfered	with	
him,	–	here	was	a	teaching	which	accompanied	him	all	day,	accompanied	him	even	into	sleep	
and	dreams;	 into	 his	 thinking,	 and	 showed	him	 through	what	 a	 long	ancestry	 his	 thoughts	
descend;	 into	 society,	 and	 showed	 by	 what	 affinities	 he	 was	 girt	 to	 his	 equals	 and	 his	
counterparts;	 into	natural	objects,	and	showed	their	origin	and	meaning,	what	are	 friendly,	
																																																								68	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	108.	69	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	243.	
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and	what	are	hurtful;	and	opened	the	future	world,	by	indicating	the	continuity	of	the	same	
laws.70	
	 	
	 However,	 while	 Emerson	 is	 impressed	 with	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘depth	 of	 ethical	 wisdom’,	 he	
draws	into	question	the	nature	of	his	experiences	in	the	‘spirit	realm’.	Emerson	voices	his	suspicions	
that	Swedenborg	suffers	from	delusions	of	grandeur	or	mental	imbalance.		
	
In	 his	 fifty-fourth	 year	 these	 thoughts	 held	 him	 fast,	 and	 his	 profound	mind	 admitted	 the	
perilous	opinion,	too	frequent	in	religious	history,	that	he	was	an	abnormal	person,	to	whom	
was	granted	 the	privilege	of	 conversing	with	angels	and	 spirits;	and	 this	ecstacy	 connected	
itself	 with	 just	 this	 office	 of	 explaining	 the	 moral	 import	 of	 the	 sensible	 world.	 To	 a	 right	
perception,	at	once	broad	and	minute,	of	the	order	of	nature,	he	added	the	comprehension	of	
the	moral	 laws	 in	their	widest	social	aspects;	but	whatever	he	saw,	through	some	excessive	
determination	to	form,	 in	his	constitution,	he	saw	not	abstractly,	but	 in	pictures,	heard	 it	 in	
dialogues,	constructed	it	in	events.	When	he	attempted	to	announce	the	law	most	sanely,	he	
was	forced	to	couch	it	in	parable.	Modern	psychology	offers	no	similar	example	of	a	deranged	
balance.71		
	
An	‘abnormal	person’,	‘deranged’	–	Emerson	does	not	hold	back	in	the	articulation	of	his	doubts	as	
to	 the	 mental	 condition	 of	 Swedenborg.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 echo	 of	 nineteenth-century	
terminology	 may	 strike	 us	 as	 harsh	 today	 –	 especially	 in	 an	 essay	 that	 is	 intended	 to	 portray	 a	
‘representative’,	a	hero	of	 the	time	–,	whereas	these	qualifications	may	have	resonated	differently	
then.	In	this	respect,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	‘modern	psychology’	that	Emerson	refers	to,	looks	
nothing	like	today’s	science	of	psychology.		In	the	nineteenth	century	the	psyche	was	only	first	being	
discovered,	and	mental	processes	were	often	understood	in	theological	concepts.	The	point	to	take	
away	from	this	quotation,	however,	is	the	fact	that	Emerson	does	not	view	Swedenborg’s	claims	to	
conversations	 with	 angels	 and	 spirits	 as	 a	 problem,	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 result	 of	 an	 ‘excessive	
determination	 to	 form’;	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘constitution’	 was	 apparently	 geared	 to	 generate	 ‘pictures	
and	dialogues’.		
	 The	 next	 excerpt	 illustrates	 not	 only	 Emerson’s	 advanced	 style	 of	 writing	 but	 also	 his	
tendency	to	‘obscure’	his	thought.		
	
																																																								70	Emerson,	Representative	Men,	439.	71	Ibid.,	437.	
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[Swedenborg’s]	 fastens	each	natural	object	 to	a	 theologic	notion;	–	 a	horse	 signifies	 carnal	
understanding;	 a	 tree,	 perception;	 the	 moon,	 faith;	 a	 cat	 means	 this;	 an	 ostrich,	 that;	 an	
artichoke,	this	other;	and	poorly	tethers	every	symbol	to	a	several	ecclesiastic	sense	[sic].	The	
slippery	Proteus	is	not	so	easily	caught.	In	nature,	each	individual	symbol	plays	innumerable	
parts,	as	each	particle	of	matter	circulates	in	turn	through	every	system.	The	central	identity	
enables	any	one	symbol	to	express	successively	all	the	qualities	and	shades	of	real	being.	 In	
the	 transmission	of	 heavenly	waters,	 every	 hose	 fits	 every	 hydrant.	Nature	 avenges	 herself	
speedily	on	the	hard	pedantry	that	would	chain	her	waves.	She	is	no	literalist.72		
	
In	this	evaluation	of	Swedenborg’s	theory	of	correspondences,	Emerson	resorts	to	irony	–	almost	to	
the	point	of	insult.	But	in	the	end	he	seems	to	get	carried	away,	only	to	loose	himself	in	obscurity.		
	 It	would	be	possible	to	give	many	more	examples	of	Emerson’s	ambivalence	in	his	portrayal	
of	Swedenborg.	For	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	I	will,	however,	constrain	myself	and	present	one	last	
quotation	 that	 will	 serve	 as	 a	 final	 assessment	 of	 ‘Swedenborg	 the	 Mystic’,	 as	 formulated	 by	
Emerson.		
	
The	genius	of	Swedenborg,	largest	of	all	modern	souls	in	this	department	of	thought,	wasted	
itself	 in	 the	 endeavour	 to	 re-animate	 and	 conserve	what	 had	already	arrived	at	 its	 natural	
term,	and,	in	the	great	secular	Providence,	was	retiring	from	its	prominence,	before	western	
modes	 of	 thought	 and	 expression.	 Swedenborg	 and	 Behmen	 both	 failed	 by	 attaching	
themselves	 to	 the	 Christian	 symbol,	 instead	 of	 to	 the	 moral	 sentiment,	 which	 carries	
innumberable	christianities,	humanities,	divinities	in	its	bosom.73		
	
Clearly,	 Emerson	 regards	 Swedenborg	 as	 an	 intellectual	 man	 who	 unfortunately	 worked	 on	 the	
wrong	project.	He	was	‘wasting	his	genius’	in	an	attempt	to	revive	a	theology,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	
an	 institution,	 that	 had	 outlived	 its	 days.	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘vice’	 was	 clinging	 to	 Christianity	 in	 his	
teachings,	 whereas	 he	 should	 have	 opted	 for	 an	 individualist,	 ethical	 approach.	 In	 other	 words:	
Swedenborg	was	a	brilliant	but	misguided	fool	–	like	Jacob	Böhme	for	that	matter.	And	so,	it	would	
seem	that	we	have	finally	arrived	at	Emerson’s	definition	of	the	‘mystic’.		
	
1.8	 Recapitulating:	on	narratives,	framing	and	Emersonian	ambivalence	
Recapitulating	we	find	that,	although	Emerson	has	reserved	a	place	for	Swedenborg	in	his	gallery	of	
Representative	Men,	 he	 seems	 to	 do	 so	 reluctantly	 and	 with	 apprehension.	 Emerson	 approaches																																																									72	Emerson,	Representative	Men,	438-9.	73	Ibid.,	447.	
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Swedenborg	alternately	as	a	scientist,	a	theologian,	a	‘wanting’	poet	and,	occasionally,	a	delusional	
mind.	 Arguably,	 in	 Emerson’s	 view	 Swedenborg	 is	 the	 scientist	 and	 philosopher	 without	 a	 sound	
rational	 footing	 for	 this	 philosophical	 system.	 And	 so,	 he	 portrays	 Swedenborg	 by	 means	 of	 a	
contrast	 to	 Plato	 –	 an	 unfavourable	 contrast	 because	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 claims	 to	 the	 ‘revelatory’	
character	of	his	experiences	as	a	result	of	which	Emerson	conclusively	labels	him	a	‘mystic’.		
	 Earlier	we	have	 found	 that	Emerson’s	evaluation	of	Swedenborg	hinged	 in	part	on	 indirect	
sources,	while	he	was	in	the	habit	of	diffusing	his	own	thought	with	those	of	others	and	obscuring	his	
sources.	Based	on	 the	above,	Emerson’s	 ‘mystical’	qualification	of	 Swedenborg	 seems	 to	 rest	on	a	
thin	 foundation	–	arguably,	 his	 likeness	 to	Böhme.	Or	 rather:	 the	 similarity	of	 their	 experiences	of	
direct	divine	revelation.		
	 Emerson’s	intuitivist	philosophy	did	not	have	a	problem	with	‘mystical	experiences’	as	a	road	
to	 direct	 knowledge	 of	 the	 divine.	 But	 he	 did	 have	 a	 problem	 with	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophical	
system.	The	doctrine	of	correspondences	was	qualified	as	‘rigid’	which	may	have	been	a	deliberate	
misrepresentation.	 And	 Emerson	 could	 not	 agree	 to	 an	 ontology	 that	 included	 a	 hierarchical	
universe;	 the	 postulate	 of	 a	 spiritual	 realm	 could	 be	 relegated	 to	 ‘imagination’,	 but	 the	 idea	 of	
mediators	between	man	and	God	was	too	much.	Emerson’s	‘god	within’	could	not	tolerate	this	type	
of	obstruction.		
	 Conclusively,	we	 find	 that	 in	America	at	 the	mid-nineteenth	century	Ralph	Waldo	Emerson	
was	 instrumental	 in	 the	articulation	of	a	narrative	 in	which	Swedenborg	 is	portrayed	as	a	 ‘mystic’,	
thereby	either	creating	or	contributing	to	the	reinforcement	of	a	‘mystical	frame’.			
	
*	*	*	*	*	
	
In	 ‘The	Writings	 of	 Ralph	Waldo	 Emerson’74	Theodore	 Parker	 presents	 an	 extensive	 review	 of	 the	
body	of	 Emerson’s	writings	up	 to	1850.	With	 respect	 to	Representative	Men	 Parker	 finds	 that	 it	 is	
‘the	 best	 critique’	 of	 Swedenborg	 that	 has	 so	 far	 appeared;	 Emerson	 appreciates	 but	 does	 not	
exaggerate	 his	 excellence. 75 	Interestingly,	 Frothingham	 also	 criticizes	 Emerson’s	 portrait	 of	
Swedenborg,	but	not	on	the	same	grounds	as	Parker	–	as	we	shall	see	in	the	next	chapter.		
																																																								74	Published	in	The	Massachusetts	Quarterly	Review,	III,	(March,	1850),	200-255.	75	Kurtz,	The	Sources	and	Development	of	Emerson’s	Representative	Men,	395.	
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CHAPTER	2	 OCTAVIUS	BROOKS	FROTHINGHAM	
	
This	 chapter	 will	 introduce	 Octavius	 Brooks	 Frothingham	 and	 present	 a	 brief	 sketch	 of	 the	
transformation	of	his	beliefs	over	time.	In	addition,	we	will	discuss	Frothingham’s	argumentation	in	
the	1882	article,	 and	his	 critique	of	 the	Emersonian	 ‘frame’	of	 Swedenborg.	Also,	 this	 chapter	will	
present	Henry	 James	Sr	as	a	nineteenth-century	Swedenborgian,	and	Frothingham’s	assessment	of	
the	position	of	the	elder	James.	Central	to	the	chapter	are	two	questions.	Why	did	Frothingham	opt	
for	 a	 different	 interpretation	 of	 Swedenborg	 –	 a	 philosopher	 and	 social	 reformer	 rather	 than	 a	
mystic?	And,	on	what	grounds	does	Frothingham	favour	the	 interpretation	by	Henry	James	Sr	over	
Emerson’s?	More	importantly,	this	chapter	will	articulate	the	epistemological	problematic	 involving	
the	claim	to	immediate	revelation	by	Swedenborg.			
	
2.1	 Introducing	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham	
Octavius	Brooks	 Frothingham76	was	 typically	 an	 adept	of	 the	New	England	of	 Emerson.	Over	 time,	
however,	 he	 became	drawn	 to	 the	more	 radical	 interpretation	 of	 Transcendentalism	by	 Theodore	
Parker	whom	he	also	considered	a	close	personal	friend.77	Born	in	Boston	on	November	26,	1822	as	
the	 son	 of	 a	 prominent	 Unitarian	 minister,	 young	 Octavius	 grew	 up	 in	 a	 liberal	 Christian	 milieu.	
Following	in	his	father’s	footsteps,	he	graduated	from	the	Harvard	Divinity	School	in	1846.	The	next	
year,	 on	 March	 23,	 Frothingham	 married	 Caroline	 Elizabeth	 Curtis	 (1825-1900),	 daughter	 of	 a	
wealthy	merchant	family	in	Boston.	On	January	27,	1850	their	only	child,	a	daughter	named	Elizabeth	
‘Bessie’	Bowditch,	was	born.		
	 His	first	position	as	pastor	brought	him	in	1847	to	the	North	Unitarian	Church	in	Salem	where	
he	would	stay	for	eight	years.	During	his	Salem	ministry	Frothingham	started	writing,	contributing	in	
particular	 to	 The	 Christian	 Examiner,	 a	 liberal	 journal	 that	 was	 influential	 in	 Unitarian	 circles.	
Frothingham	 established	 himself	 as	 an	 authority	 in	 Biblical	 criticism	 in	 the	 German	 tradition	 of	
F.C.	Baur	 and	 the	 Tübingen	 School.	 It	 was	 Parker	 who	 introduced	 Frothingham	 to	 this	 school	 of	
radical	 theology.	Parker,	who	was	a	staunch	abolitionist,	also	played	a	major	 role	 in	Frothingham’s	
theological	‘radicalization’	that	eventually	led	to	a	break	with	his	congregation.		
	 On	Sunday	June	4,	1854,	Frothingham	denounced	from	the	pulpit	the	rendition	of	a	runaway	
slave	 named	Anthony	 Burns	 in	 Boston.	 Four	 years	 earlier	 the	 Fugitive	 Slave	Act	 had	 been	 passed,	
stipulating	 that	 upon	 capture	 escaped	 slaves	 were	 to	 be	 returned	 to	 their	 masters;	 officials	 and																																																									76	Unless	otherwise	indicated	the	information	in	this	short	biography	is	based	on	the	book	Octavius	
Brooks	Frothingham,	Gentle	Radical	(Alabama:	The	University	of	Alabama	Press,	1977)	and	the	article	‘Who	Was	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham?’,	in	The	New	England	Quarterly	(1970),	both	by	J.	Wade	Caruthers.	77	Frothingham,	Recollections	and	Impressions	1882-1890,	134.	
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citizens	 of	 free	 states	 were	 forced	 to	 cooperate	 fully	 in	 this	 law.	 In	 what	 is	 now	 known	 as	 his	
‘Anthony	 Burns’	 sermon	 Frothingham	 fulminated	 against	 a	 Christian	 faith	 that	 had	 subverted	 the	
injunction	of	Christ	to	love	one	another.	He	attacked	the	rampant	sectarianism,	the	blind	defence	of	
dogma,	 and	 the	 insistence	 on	 belief	 rather	 than	 kind	 expressions	 of	 love	 and	 brotherhood.	 The	
church	had	become	hollow,	and	its	rituals	meaningless.	Frothingham’s	position	in	these	early	years	
was	a	foreshadowing	of	the	ethical	approach	to	faith	that	he	would	develop	in	his	later	years.	
	 Inevitably,	the	commotion	that	was	caused	by	the	‘Anthony	Burns’	sermon	led	to	the	parting	
from	his	Salem	congregation,	and	in	1855	Frothingham	moved	with	his	family	to	a	ministry	in	Jersey	
City.	 In	1859,	on	the	brink	of	war,	he	moved	again,	 this	time	to	the	Third	Unitarian	Congregational	
Church	in	New	York	City.		
	
2.2	 From	radical	Unitarianism	to	Free	Religion		
“Then	 came	 the	 war.	 Though	 its	 physical	 aspect	 –	 the	 loss	 of	 treasure	 and	 of	 blood	 –	 was	most	
affecting,	 I	 cannot	 but	 think	 that	 its	 mental	 and	 moral	 aspect	 has	 been	 underrated.	 Its	 whole	
justification	 lay	 in	 its	moral	 character,	 and	 I	must	 believe	 that	 full	 justice	 has	 never	 been	 done	 to	
those	who	were	 obliged	 to	 stay	 at	 home	 and	 uphold	 this	 feature.	 The	 preacher	 of	 the	 Gospel	 of	
Peace	 had	 as	 much	 as	 he	 could	 do	 to	 overcome	 the	 horrors	 of	 war;	 and	 the	 preacher	 of	
Righteousness	was	 engaged	 all	 the	 time	 in	 promoting	 the	 cause	 of	 justice.	 They	who	went	 to	 the	
front	 had	 the	 excitement	 of	 battle,	 the	pleasures	 of	 camp-life,	 the	 assistance	of	 comradeship,	 the	
comfort	of	 sympathy.	The	preacher	had	none	of	 these.”78	And	so,	when	 in	1865	 the	Civil	War	was	
over,	Frothingham	found	himself	‘spent	and	aged’.		
	 After	the	Civil	War	Frothingham	did	not	associate	himself	with	Transcendentalism	anymore,	
and	he	convinced	his	congregation	to	detach	from	the	Unitarian	denomination,	changing	its	name	to	
the	Independent	Liberal	Church.	As	a	Unitarian	minister	at	the	time	that	Unitarianism	was	challenged	
by	 Transcendentalism,	 he	 had	 appealed	 in	 his	 sermons	 both	 to	 the	 brain	 and	 to	 the	 heart.	
Increasingly,	however,	his	sermons	would	reflect	a	bold	religious	radicalism.	And	often	he	expressed	
his	 concern	 about	 the	 sectarian	 spirit	 that	 was	 so	 anchored	 in	 Christianity	 that	 it	 prevented	 the	
human	race	of	ever	achieving	a	common	ground	of	ideas	and	a	spirit	of	brotherhood.		
	 During	his	twenty	years	in	New	York	Frothingham	developed	a	theological	vision,	a	synthesis	
of	elements	of	Deism,	Transcendentalism,	and	Darwinism	with	an	overlay	of	the	Puritan	spirit.	 In	a	
gross	 oversimplification	 and	 foregoing	 many	 of	 his	 finer	 theological	 and	 social	 subtleties,	
Frothingham’s	radical	ethical	religious	vision	can	be	characterized	as	follows:	traditional	Christianity	
was	 to	 be	 severely	 criticized	 for	 its	 ecclesiastical,	 dogmatic,	 rigid	 orthodoxy.	 The	 Christian	 faith																																																									78	Frothingham,	Recollections	and	Impressions,	106.	
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desperately	 needed	modernizing,	 and	 Frothingham	 searched	 for	 new	 interpretations,	 questioning	
old	 symbols,	 finding	new	meanings	 and	 truths	 in	 the	emancipation	of	human	nature.	 Evolutionary	
theories	sparked	his	thinking	as	to	the	intellectual	and	ethical	progress	of	mankind.	He	supported	the	
thought	that	the	forces	of	nature	and	society	were	in	conjunction,	working	together	progressively	to	
a	 humanistic	 ideal.	 The	 key	 to	 progress	 was	 human	 effort,	 for,	 in	 Frothingham’s	 view	 ethics	 and	
truths	grew	out	of	human	experience.	He	named	his	newly	emerging	theism	a	‘religion	of	humanity’,	
in	 accordance	 to	 his	 view	 of	 religion	 as	 a	 universal	 truth	 transcending	 time	 and	 place.	 His	 radical	
liberal	 theological	vision,	a	 ‘free	religion’	 in	every	sense,	was	 laid	down	 in	his	Religion	of	Humanity	
(1872).	
	 In	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	Frothingham	had	become	the	undisputed	leader	
of	 a	 radical-ethical	 movement	 in	 Unitarianism	 in	 America.	 He	 helped	 reinterpret	 much	 of	 the	
Christian	dogmas	in	terms	of	modern	scientific,	literary,	and	historiographical	knowledge.	And	so,	in	
May	1867,	when	a	group	of	religious	liberals	assembled	on	Memorial	Day,	Frothingham	was	elected	
to	become	the	first	president	of	the	newly	formed	Free	Religious	Association	(FRA),	a	position	that	he	
held	until	1878.	The	FRA	was	founded	as	a	result	of	the	growing	dissatisfaction	of	‘radical	Unitarians’	
to	organize	a	national	 convention	of	Unitarian	churches.	 Fear	of	denominational	 conformity	 led	 to	
the	 foundation	of	 the	 FRA	 that	 decidated	 itself	 to	 promoting	 a	 rational,	 nonsectarian	 approach	 to	
religion.	 The	 radical	 Unitarians	 who	 formed	 the	 FRA	were	 a	 diverse	 group,	 consisting	 on	 the	 one	
hand	of	idealistic	Transcendentalists	–	such	as	David	A.	Wasson	(1823-1887),	Samuel	Johnson	(1882-
1882)	and	Samuel	Longfellow	(1819-1892)	–	who	stuck	to	their	intuitive	epistemology.	On	the	other	
hand,	 there	 was	 a	 younger,	 more	 rationalistic	 segment	 led	 by	 Frothingham	 and	 Francis	 E.	 Abbot	
(1836-1903)	whose	orientation	was	more	directed	 towards	 the	social	positivism	of	Auguste	Comte	
(1798-1857).79			
	
2.3	 Parker	and	the	Swedenborgian	mode	of	thinking		
Being	part	of	the	theological	discourse	at	the	time,	Frothingham	was	more	than	adequately	equipped	
to	cover	the	narratives	of	the	era.	He	became	one	of	Transcendentalism’s	first	historians,	composing	
a	series	of	works	on	the	movement	and	its	leaders.	Most	notable	in	this	respect	is	Transcendentalism	
in	New	England	 (1876)	 that	 is	 still	 highly	 valued	as	 a	 standard	work.	He	also	wrote	biographies	of	
notable	 contemporary	 Unitarian	 clergymen,	 such	 as	William	 Henry	 Channing	 (1810-1884)	 and	 his	
own	 father	 Nathaniel	 Langdon	 Frothingham	 (1793-1870)	 as	 well	 as	 	 of	 abolitionist	 and	 politician	
Gerritt	Smith	(1797-1874)	and	his	friend	and	member	of	his	congregation	George	Ripley	(1802-1880).	
																																																								79	Cashdollar,	European	Positivism	and	the	American	Unitarians,	502.	
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His	 first	 major	 historical	 biographical	 work,	 how	 could	 it	 be	 otherwise,	 was	 his	 Life	 of	 Theodore	
Parker,	published	in	1874.		
Dorrien	 identifies	 Theodore	 Parker	 as	 “the	 first	 American	 to	 approach	 theology	 from	 a	
standpoint	deeply	informed	by	German	theology,	philosophy,	and	historiocritical	scholarship”;	“he	is	
the	 pivotal	 figure	 in	 the	 Unitarian	 tradition,	 the	 one	 from	whom	 its	 neo-Christian	 and	 humanistic	
tradition	 both	 derive”.80	If	 Emerson	 was	 Transcendentalism’s	 poetic	 leader,	 Theodore	 Parker	 was	
without	 a	 doubt	 its	 spiritual	 father.	 In	 my	 research	 I	 found	 multiple	 intersections	 in	 the	 lives	 of	
Frothingham	and	Parker	that	this	thesis	regrettably	cannot	address.	Important,	however,	is	Parker’s	
influence	 on	 Frothingham’s	 early	 conception	 of	 Swedenborgian	 thought	 which	 Frothingham	
associated	with	‘mysticism’.		
To	 Frothingham,	 theories	 of	 evolutionary	 advancement	 were	 crucial	 in	 understanding	 the	
intellectual	and	ethical	progress	of	mankind.	At	the	same	time,	he	tried	to	‘synthesize’	evolution	as	a	
scientific	 given	with	his	prior	 transcendental	 view	of	 the	 intuitive,	a	priori	mode	of	 thought.	 “As	 a	
transcendentalist	he	believed	God	was	within	man	and	nature;	as	an	evolutionist	he	was	sure	all	the	
forces	of	nature	and	 society	were	working	 toward	a	progressive,	humanistic	end”.81	He	never	 fully	
rejected	theism,	and	hence,	never	fully	accepted	a	–	reductionist	–	position	that	viewed	science	as	
the	 only	 key	 to	 reason.	 However,	 rather	 than	 coming	 from	 some	 transcendent	 God,	 ‘truth’	 or	
‘supreme	wisdom’	was	to	be	found	within	the	human	mind.	Central	to	his	notion	of	progress	were	
human	effort	and	human	experience	as	the	basic	requirements	for	a	truthful,	ethical	lifestyle.	
In	 addition,	 however,	 Frothingham	 was	 influenced	 by	 ‘the	 Swedenborgian	 mode	 of	
theological	 thinking’.	Parker	had	 introduced	him	 to	 the	 thought	of	Emanuel	 Swedenborg	 “who	 led	
Parker	 himself	 and	 many	 of	 his	 followers	 in	 Frothingham’s	 generation	 to	 be	 inclined	 toward	 the	
intuitional,	inner	light	approach	to	spiritual	knowledge”.82	In	September	1861,	Frothingham	wrote	an	
article	 ‘Mystics	 and	 their	 Creed’	 for	 the	Christian	Examiner,	 in	which	he	 reviewed	 the	 two-volume	
compendium	Hours	with	the	Mystics	(London,	1856)	by	Robert	Albert	Vaughan	(1823-1857).83	In	his	
review	 he	 equated	 ‘mysticism’	 with	 Transcendentalism.	 “It	 was	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Parker	 and	
Emerson,	he	thought,	which	emphasized	the	indwelling	God,	the	spirit	of	Christ	and	not	the	man,	and	
the	Pantheistic	 view	 that	God	was	 in	nature.”84	And	 so	we	 find	 that,	while	 Frothingham’s	 radically	
changing	 beliefs	 towards	 a	 rational,	 ethical	 ‘free	 religion’	 rejected	 any	 speculations	 involving	 a	
																																																								80	Dorrien,	The	Making	of	American	Liberal	Theology:	Imagining	Progressive	Religion	1805-1900,	xvii.	81	Caruthers,	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham,	Gentle	Radical,	76.	82	Ibid.,	76.	83	Published	in	Christian	Examiner,	Vol.	73,	1861.	84	Caruthers,	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham,	63.	
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supernaturalist	ontology,	he	remained	supportive	of	the	possibility	of	an	intuitive	knowledge	of	the	
divine.		
	
2.4	 The	1881	controversy:	‘Has	O.B.	Frothingham	recanted?’	
Health	problems	forced	Frothingham	to	retire	from	his	New	York	ministry	in	1879,	when	he	was	57	
years	old.	Back	 in	Boston,	after	a	 trip	 to	Europe	with	his	wife	and	daughter,	a	public	debate	arose	
over	 an	 alleged	 change	 in	 his	 religious	 views.	 In	 an	 interview	 in	 the	 New	 York	 Evening	 Post	 of	
November	12,	1881	under	the	caption	‘Radical	Thought’,	Frothingham	was	quoted	to	have	lost	trust	
in	 the	validity	of	his	 thoughts.	He	was	 sceptical	about	 the	 future	of	 ‘free	 religion’,	 as	 it	 seemed	 to	
lead	to	nothing,	and	independent	religious	congregations,	such	as	his	own	ministry	in	New	York	and	
earlier	Theodore	Parker’s	in	Boston,	had	failed	to	live	up	to	his	expectations.85	The	article	sparked	a	
controversy	 as	 to	whether	 Frothingham	had	 become	disillusioned	with	 ‘free	 religion’.	 Had	 he	 first	
repudiated	Transcendentalism,	and	did	he	now,	 in	 turn,	 reject	 the	validity	of	 rationalism?	 In	short,	
the	question	on	everyone’s	lips	was:	Has	O.B.	Frothingham	recanted?86		
The	New	 York	 Times	 followed	 up	 with	 an	 editorial,	 titled	 ‘From	 Rationalism	 to	 Rome’,	 in	
which	Frothingham	was	given	credit	for	his	sincerity	in	his	sermons.	However,	the	accusation	of	his	
having	 changed	his	 religious	 views	was	 flatly	 repeated.	He	was	even	 charged	with	being	drawn	 to	
Catholicism,	as	Frothingham	had	 favourably	noticed	 the	ability	of	 the	Catholic	 clergy	 to	hold	on	 to	
their	congregations.	“He	has	given	up	belief	in	the	infallibility	of	his	own	reason”,	was	the	patronizing	
editorial	 comment.87	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 of	 Frothingham’s	 fellow	 clergymen	 came	 to	 his	
defence,	the	controversy	of	his	alleged	recantation	did	not	subside.	On	Sundays	from	pulpits	all	over	
the	land,	the	‘failure’	of	free	thought,	the	death	of	liberalism,	was	memorized.88		
Frothingham	himself	kept	a	dignified	silence.	His	natural	scepticism	and	his	capacity	for	self-
criticism	were	seen	as	a	sign	of	his	total	denial	of	previous	positions.	However,	his	frosty	exterior	in	
conjunction	with	his	impeccable	New	England	background	was	only	an	effective	but	outward	façade.	
“It	had	always	been	Frothingham’s	way,	 indeed	a	part	of	his	heritage,	to	proceed	as	if	he	was	right	
but	 be	 sure	 there	 was	 a	 chance	 he	 was	 wrong.	 He	 doubted	 as	 he	 believed,	 his	 beliefs	 subjected	
always	to	the	scrutiny	of	his	own	skepticism.	He	was	a	believing	skeptic”.89		
He	 spent	 the	winter	months	 of	 1881	 and	1882	 at	 the	Vendome	Hotel	 in	Boston,	 after	 the	
controversy	had	died	down,	at	least	for	a	while.	And	so,	after	his	beliefs	had	been	questioned	widely																																																									85	Caruthers,	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham,	190.	86	Ibid.,	189.	87	Ibid.,	191.	88	Ibid.,	193-4.	89	Ibid.,	195.	
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in	 a	 very	 public	 arena,	 Frothingham	 retreated	 to	 his	 hometown	 –	 preparing	 himself	 to	 write	 the	
article	‘Swedenborg’	to	which	we	now	direct	our	attention.		
	
2.5	 Polemics	and	perceptions:	Frothingham’s	1882	article	revisited	
‘Swedenborg’,	 the	 article	 by	 Frothingham	under	 review,	was	 published	 in	 June	 1882	 in	The	North	
American	 Review.90	It	 was	 written,	 however,	 much	 earlier,	 during	 Frothingham’s	 first	 winter	 in	
Boston.	This	detail	 is	 important	 in	view	of	the	fact	that	Emerson	passed	away	 in	April	1882,	as	this	
means	that	the	article	–	including	Frothingham’s	critique	of	Emerson	–	was	written	before	Emerson’s	
demise.	 In	 the	 article	 Frothingham	 presents	 a	 critical	 overview	 of	 the	 American	 liberal	 religious	
landscape	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	Central	to	his	message	is	his	assessment	that	
religious	 liberalism	 is	 dead	 –	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 liberal	 churches	 are	 in	 decline.	 In	 view	 of	 this	
deplorable	situation	he	questions	the	validity	and	viability	of	Swedenborgianism	–	as	an	 institution	
and	as	a	philosophy.			
	 In	 view	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Frothingham	was	 a	 biographer,	 his	 portrayal	 of	 Swedenborg	 is	 of	
interest.	 He	 characterizes	 Swedenborg	 as	 “outwardly,	 an	 old-fashioned	 man,	 simple,	 child-like,	
unsophisticated,	 uncritical,	 ingenuous,	 believing;	 an	 impersonal,	 unambitious,	 devout	man;	 a	 seer	
rather	than	a	thinker;	not	a	reader	of	many	religious	books,	or	deferential	to	the	writers	of	books;	an	
interior,	brooding	man,	unconscious	of	much	that	went	on	in	the	intellectual	world	about	him,	and	so	
far	as	is	known,	independent	of	contemporary	assistance”.91	Although	Frothingham	seems	somewhat	
mistaken	on	the	Swede’s	intellectual	awareness	of	the	outside	world,	remarkable	is	the	reference	to	
Swedenborg’s	supposed	indifference	to	the	‘writers	of	books’.	First	of	all,	Silver	remarks	that	in	all	of	
his	scientific	work	Swedenborg	never	actually	performed	any	experiments	or	engaged	in	dissections	
on	his	own.	“His	theories	were	derived	entirely	from	a	close	study	of	the	empirical	findings	of	other	
scientists”,	implying	he	must	have	read	massively.92	Moreover,	although	speculative,	this	observation	
could	also	point	to	Emerson	–	given	that	he	was	a	famous	author	in	1882.	Was	Frothingham	covertly	
commenting	on	Emerson’s	notoriety?	 If	so,	then	a	passage	 later	 in	the	article	may	be	applicable	to	
Emerson	 too.	 Here	 Frothingham	 advises	 some	 people	 to	 best	 leave	 Swedenborg	 alone,	 for	 they	
would	not	understand	him	“even	 if	 they	can	read	him”.	He	points	specifically	to	the	 ‘cool	eclectic’,	
the	‘careless	quidnunc	in	the	world	of	letters’,	the	‘knowing	adept	in	the	special	peculiarities	of	the	
																																																								90	Caruthers,	Octavius	Brooks	Frothingham,	198.	Caruthers	argues	that	‘Swedenborg’	was	the	first	in	a	series	of	four	articles.	He	informs	that	two	more	articles	appeared	in	the	North	American	Review,	‘Criticism	of	Christianity’	and	‘Democracy	and	Moral	Progess’,	while	‘Some	Phases	of	Idealism	in	New	England’	was	published	in	Atlantic	Monthly.	All	three	articles	were	published	in	July	1883.	In	view	of	the	time	gap	and	the	subject	matter,	in	my	opinion,	‘Swedenborg’	should	be	considered	as	a	separate	essay.		91	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	605.	92	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	27.	
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‘schools’’,	 and	 the	 ‘quick-witted	 critic	 of	 other	 mens’s	 ideas’.93	Arguably,	 these	 descriptions	 may	
easily	refer	to	Emerson,	disguised	as	an	insider’s	joke.	But	again,	this	is	speculative.		
	 Fact	is	that	Frothingham	openly	challenges	Emerson	when	he	states	
	
Mr.	 Emerson	 puts	 him	 [Swedenborg]	 among	 the	 mystics,	 ranking	 him	 somewhat	
incongruously	with	Socrates,	Plotinus,	Porphyry,	Behmen,	Bunyan,	Fox,	Pascal,	Guion;	speaks	
of	him	as	the	most	remarkable	example	of	the	introverted	mind	that	has	appeared	in	modern	
times;	says:	‘To	a	right	perception,	at	once	broad	and	minute,	of	the	order	of	nature	he	added	
the	 comprehension	of	 the	moral	 laws	 in	 their	 social	 aspects’,	 and	assigns	him	a	place	 long	
vacant	 among	 the	 law-givers	 of	mankind.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 he	 places	 him	below	Behmen,	
accuses	 him	 of	 believing	 in	 devils,	 charges	 him	 with	 circumscribing	 the	 divine	 benignity,	
makes	much	of	his	Hebraic	 limitations,	 and	declines	 to	 say	wherein	his	peculiarity	 consists.	
With	such	an	opinion	it	is	not	strange	that	Mr.	Emerson	sometimes	doubts	whether	his	books	
will	be	long	read,	whether	his	great	name	will	not	‘turn	a	sentence’.94		
	
Frothingham	highlights	 the	ambivalence	 in	Emerson’s	portrayal	of	Swedenborg.	 Is	 it	 in	 jest	 that	he	
points	 to	 a	 concern	 that	 Emerson	 may	 have	 articulated	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 sustainability	 of	 his	
literary	 fame?	 Unfortunately,	 I	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 locate	 the	 reference	 ‘turn	 a	 sentence’	 in	
Emerson’s	 works	 nor	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 English	 idiom.	 It	 is	 rather	 striking,	 however,	 that	 Frothingham	
mentions	 Emerson’s	 concerns	 on	 ‘his	 great	 name’	 in	 view	 of	 Kurtz’s	 argument	 with	 respect	 to	
Emerson’s	development	of	a	great	man	theory.	Of	course,	in	view	of	Emerson’s	demise	two	months	
prior	to	publication,	Frothingham’s	observation	could	be	regarded	as	particularly	abrasive;	hence,	my	
earlier	remark	about	the	timing	of	the	writing	of	the	article.		
	 Evidently,	Frothingham	did	not	agree	with	Emerson’s	evaluation	of	Swedenborg.	Instead,	he	
found	a	strong	message	 in	Swedenborg’s	 teachings	that	resonated	with	his	own	ethical	 ‘religion	of	
humanity’,	 and	 that	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 seems	 to	 correspond	with	 the	 position	 of	Henry	 James	 Sr.95	
James	 was	 a	 theologian	 of	 Irish	 decent	 and	 a	 Swedenborgian	 since	 the	 mid-1840s.	 Only	 shortly	
before,	he	had	published	The	Secret	of	Swedenborg,	Being	an	Elucidation	of	His	Doctrine	of	the	Divine																																																									93	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	614.	94	Ibid.,	615.	Evidently,	Socrates,	Plotinus,	and	Porphyry	are	well-known	philosophers	from	Greek	and	Roman	ancient	worlds.	Other	names	in	the	quotation	refer	to	German	mystic	Jakob	Böhme	(1575-1624),	Scottish	puritan	preacher	John	Bunyan	(1628-1688),	English	founder	of	the	Society	of	Friends,	also	known	as	Quakers,	George	Fox	(1624-1691),	and	French	mystic	Jeanne	Marie	Bouvier	de	la	Motte,	aka	Madame	Guyon	(1648-1717).	French	mathematician	and	philosopher	Blaise	Pascal	(1623-1662)	is	known	to	have	left	a	‘mystical’	posthumous	message,	usually	referred	to	as	his	‘Mémorial’.		95	Incidently,	Henry	James	Sr.	is	also	known	as	the	father	of	philosopher	and	founder	of	the	psychology	of	religion	William	James,	novelist	Henry	James	Jr.,	and	diarist	Alice	James.	
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Natural	 Humanity	 (1869)	 and	 Society:	 the	 Redeemed	 Form	 of	 Man,	 and	 the	 Earnest	 of	 God's	
Omnipotence	in	Human	Nature	(1879)	–	the	latter	publication	‘Affirmed	in	Letters	to	a	Friend’	which	
was	a	popular	literary	style	at	the	time.	Earlier	James	had	shown	an	interest	in	Brook	Farm,	a	social	
experiment	 in	 communal	 living	 at	 West	 Roxbury,	 Massachusetts,	 that	 lasted	 from	 1841	 to	 1847.	
Brook	 Farm	was	 the	 brainchild	 of	 Transcendentalists	George	 Ripley	 and	 his	wife	 Sophia,	 based	 on	
their	interpretation	of	the	utopian	socialist	philosophy	of	Charles	Fourier	(1772-1837),	also	known	as	
‘Fourierism’.		
	 As	 a	 contributor	 to	 The	 Harbinger,	 the	 journal	 of	 Fourierism	 in	 America	 of	 which	 George	
Ripley	was	the	editor,	and	in	his	later	books,	James	presented	Swedenborg	as	a	social	reformer	who	
spoke	 metaphorically	 of	 what	 would	 happen	 if	 man	 accepted	 the	 responsibility	 for	 changing	
society.96	He	 is	quoted	by	 Frothingham	 to	have	 “studied	 those	writings	profoundly,	 acknowledging	
their	dumb,	 illogical,	 inarticulate,	 in	 some	 respects	 futile	 and	 fatuous,	 character,	but	 impressed	by	
their	 ‘calm,	translucent	depths’	of	wisdom,	and	finding	infinite	satisfaction	in	the	‘seer’s’	answer	to	
life’s	 eternal	 questions.	 He	 discovered	 in	 Swedenborg	 an	 astonishing	 penetration	 of	 thought,	
suggestions	 which	 pierce	 to	 the	 core	 of	 truth	 and	 open	 worlds	 of	 speculation	 which	 he	 himself	
perhaps	failed	to	explore,	a	system	of	philosophy	outlined	and	sharply	indicated,….”97	It	seems	likely	
that	James’	publications	on	Swedenborg	had	reached	Frothingham.	However,	I	have	not	been	able	to	
find	any	direct	relations	or	common	denominators	between	them,	besides	their	shared	interest	and	
optimist	outlook	in	religious	reform	as	a	road	to	social	improvement.		
	
2.6		 Swedish	seer	turned	social	reformer:	‘Swedenborg,	the	Radical’?	
As	 discussed,	 Frothingham’s	 religious	 views	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 anti-dogmatic,	 anti-sectarian,	
ethical,	and	inclusive	towards	other	religions	and	other	sources	of	divine	inspiration	–	elements	that	
he	 finds	 in	 Swedenborg’s	 writings.	 All	 throughout	 the	 article	 Frothingham	 is	 torn	 between	 his	
aversion	to	the	New	Church	and	its	followers	and	the	attraction	of	Swedenborgian	thought.	With	his	
fine	 subtlety	 he	 notes	 that	 ‘sectarians	 are	 seldom	 philosophical’,	 and	 this	 is	 particularly	 valid	 for	
Swedenborgians	 who	 cherish	 a	 sectarian	 spirit	 of	 ‘exclusiveness	 and	 formalism’.98 	Swedenborg	
himself,	 however,	 did	 not	 promulgate	 such	 sectarianism,	 on	 the	 contrary;	 his	 principles	 “cast	
discredit	 […]	 on	 all	 ecclesiastical	 organizations	 claiming	 to	 embody	 the	 spiritual,	 regenerating,	
creative,	divine	life”.99		
																																																								96	Silver,	The	Spiritual	Kingdom	in	America,	102-103.	97	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	609.	98	Ibid.,	610.	99	Ibid.,	611.	
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His	most	avid	supporters,	according	to	Frothingham,	overlook	the	philosophical	 importance	
of	 Swedenborg’s	doctrines.	 For,	 Swedenborg’s	 ideas	are	 ‘extremely	 radical’,	 implying	 “nothing	 less	
than	a	complete	revision	of	theological	articles	in	the	interest	of	anti-preternaturalism,	or	the	utter	
abdication	of	Satan	as	a	prince	potenate	[sic],	or	substantial	existence	in	the	world”.100	Interestingly,	
of	 the	 two	 issues	 that	 he	 mentions	 that	 would	 induce	 ‘complete	 theological	 revision’	 –	 anti-
preternaturalism	 and	 the	 negation	 of	 evil	 as	 substantive	 –	 he	 only	 continues	 with	 the	 latter	 to	
illustrate	his	point.	He	argues	that	all	of	the	different	branches	in	the	Christian	church	in	some	form	
or	other	adhere	to	a	theory	of	evil	as	an	‘independent,	demonic,	self-subsisting	dominion’,	engaged	
in	incessant	warfare	against	Deity,	in	which	clergymen	are	its	ordained	champions,	the	sacraments	its	
appointed	 ‘channels	 of	 grace’,	 and	 the	 Bible	 its	 revealed	 communication	 to	 mankind.	 “The	 sects	
differ	 in	the	explanation	they	give	of	these	points,	but	under	some	form	they	are	held.	Not	to	hold	
them	 under	 any	 form	 is	 to	 discard	 the	 Christian	 peculiarity,	 and	 lapse	 either	 into	 ‘naturalism’	 or	
‘idealism’.101	In	 Swedenborg’s	 teachings,	 by	 contrast,	 evil	 is	 not	 given	 independent	 existence	 or	
agency	outside	of	the	divine	purpose.		
From	 Swedenborg’s	 main	 principles,	 Frothingham	 infers	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 Fall	 is	
mistaken,	 and	 that	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	 that	 ‘the	 Lord’s	 love	 is	 the	 salvation	 of	 the	whole	 human	
race’	effectively	means	that	any	distinction	between	‘sheep	and	goats’	is	to	be	abolished.102	Religion	
in	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophy	becomes	 “a	purely	 spiritual	 thing”,	 based	on	 “charity,	 and	belief	 built	
upon	charity”.103	But,	whereas	Emerson	had	‘spiritualized’	religion,	Frothingham	‘ethicized’	it.	And	in	
this	sense	too,	he	finds	himself	drawn	to	the	‘revolutionary’	character	of	Swedenborg’s	teachings	–	
“little	short	of	a	new	gospel”104	–	and	he	interprets	these	as	a	blueprint	for	social	reform.		
	
That	Swedenborg’s	 conception	of	 the	 regenerate	 condition	of	man	–	 in	other	words,	of	 the	
spiritual	consummation,	or	full	completion	of	the	divine	life	–	is	the	vision	of	a	perfect	human	
society	on	earth,	a	pure	spiritual	democracy,	is	so	plainly	intimated,	so	frequently	suggested,	
and	 follows	 so	 closely	 on	 his	 other	 cardinal	 propositions,	 that	 to	 establish	 it	 by	 quotation	
would	be	a	superfluous	labor.	Such	a	conclusion	must	be	drawn	from	his	primary	doctrines	of	
																																																								100	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	610.	101	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	610-11.	102	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	611.	Frothingham’s	observation	refers	to	the	‘Parable	of	the	Sheep	and	Goats’	found	in	Matthew	25:31-46.	In	this	parable	Jesus	explains	his	views	on	man	redeemed	and	saved,	and	man	condemned	and	lost.	The	sheep	are	those	that	act	on	charity	–	feeding	the	hungry,	clothing	the	naked,	tending	to	the	sick,	and	so	forth	–,	the	goats	are	those	that	do	not.	Hence,	salvation	awaits	the	sheep,	damnation	the	goats.	In	general,	the	controversy	attached	to	this	parable	involves	the	notion	of	‘salvation	by	good	works’	versus	‘salvation	by	faith	alone’.	103	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	611.	104	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	602.	
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creation,	and	the	divine	purpose	in	regenerating	man.	The	perpetual	insistence	on	charity	as	
the	soul	of	faith	implies	it.	105	
		
The	 moral	 nature	 of	 humanity,	 the	 abolition	 of	 evil	 as	 a	 independent	 principle;	 the	 anti-
dogmatic,	inclusive	and	ethical	character	of	‘true	religion’;	it	is	easy	to	see	how	Swedenborg’s	ideas	
would	resonate	with	Frothingham’s	‘religion	of	humanity’.	In	addition,	the	‘regenerate	condition’	of	
mankind	taps	directly	into	his	evolutionary	thinking	of	man	as	a	progressive	being.	Frothingham	who	
devoted	much	 of	 his	 thinking	 to	 synthesizing	 science	 and	 religion,	 finds	 that	 Swedenborg	 moved	
from	 scientific	 to	 theological	 thought	 in	 one	 smooth	move,	 “simply	 proceeding	 from	 one	 form	 of	
communication	to	another	–	from	the	world	of	matter	to	the	world	of	spirit,	always	holding	the	same	
clue	to	knowledge,	namely:	the	doctrine	of	divine	immanence”.106	In	fact,		
	
regarded	 as	 a	 philosophy,	 the	 thoughts	 of	 Swedenborg	 penetrate	 to	 the	 roots	 of	
monotheism….	Swedenborg,	while	admitting	 that	all	 life	 is	 from	 the	 Lord,	 thus	maintaining	
that	there	is	but	a	single	absolute	principle	in	the	universe,	–	while	frankly	allowing	that	the	
Lord	turns	evil	into	good,	thus	abolishing	evil	as	a	thing,	–	does	preserve	the	substantial	facts	
of	consciousness,	and	build	[sic]	upon	them	a	structure	in	which	the	intellect	can	live	without	
resentment	or	compromise.	This	is	an	honest,	sincere,	humble	attempt	to	satisfy	the	demands	
of	the	rational	nature,	without	recourse	to	theological	subtleties.107	
	
	 Frothingham	qualifies	 Swedenborg’s	writings	 as	 a	 unique	 combination	 of	 ‘dullness	 beyond	
description	and	wisdom	beyond	estimate’.108	The	social	implications	of	his	philosophy,	however,	may	
not	have	been	Swedenborg’s	goal	per	se.	Moreover,	Frothingham	suggests	that	Swedenborg	himself	
may	 not	 have	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 his	 teachings.	 Swedenborg	 “may	 have	 prophesied	
deeper	 things	 than	he	was	aware	of,	 standing	on	 some	Pisgah	height	 and,	 from	 far,	 descrying	 the	
promised	 land	he	was	not	permitted	to	explore”.109	Swedenborg	 is	 ‘a	philosopher	of	the	 infinite’,	a	
‘mystery,	as	insoluble	as	ever’,	a	‘seer,	not	a	thinker	the	genesis	of	whose	thought	may	be	traced	in	
some	antecedent	school’.	“His	mental	roots	have	not	thus	far	been	found.	He	has	been	accused	of	
echoing	Jacob	Boehme,	but	without	evidence;	he	appeals	to	no	parentage	among	men.”110	It	puzzles																																																									105	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	612.	106	Ibid.,	601.	107	Ibid.,	614.	108	Ibid.,	609.	109	Ibid.,	613.	The	‘Pisgah	height’	in	the	quotation	refers	to	Mount	Pisgah	in	Deuteronium	34:	1-4,	the	mountain	on	which	Moses	stood	to	see	the	promised	land	which	he	was	not	allowed	to	enter.		110	Ibid.,	615.	
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Frothingham	–	to	the	point	of	uneasiness	–	that	Swedenborg’s	thought	cannot	be	traced	to	‘mental	
roots’,	to	a	‘rational’	forbearer.		
	 Ultimately,	 however,	 Frothingham	 is	 troubled	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Swedenborg	 ascribes	 his	
insights	to	‘divine	revelation’.	In	an	articulation	that	could	be	qualified	as	‘mystical’	he	states:	
	
At	 all	 events,	 there	 are	 the	 declarations.	 They	may	mean	much	 or	 they	may	mean	 little.	 If	
they	 mean	 little,	 their	 sense	 is	 exhausted,	 taken	 up,	 and	 appropriated	 by	 modern	 ‘liberal’	
churches.	 If	 they	 mean	 much,	 one	 must	 go	 outside	 of	 Swedenborgianism	 for	 their	
explanation.	For,	 in	this	case,	they	contain	a	system	of	philosophy	which	approaches	from	a	
new	direction	the	profoundest	problems	of	being	–	creation,	consciousness,	freedom.111	
	
So,	there	it	is.	A	caveat	–	with	respect	to	‘declarations’	by	Swedenborg.	What	could	it	possibly	mean?		
	
2.7	 On	the	‘declarations’		
My	 initial	 ‘hunch’	 as	 to	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 ‘declarations’	 was	 that	 these	 would	 have	 to	 refer	 to	
Swedenborg’s	 claims	 to	 communications	 with	 angels	 and	 spirits.	 On	 second	 thought,	 however,	 I	
realized	that	 ‘declarations’	could	point	to	something	entirely	different.	 In	trying	to	 find	support	 for	
my	 assumptions	 I	 have	 formulated	 a	 number	 of	 alternative	 possibilities:	 1)	 witness	 statements	 to	
three	 so-called	 ‘anecdotes’	 of	 assumed	psychic	 abilities	 in	 Swedenborg	 –	 as	 narrated	 by	 Kirven112,	
2)		historical	third-party	responses	to	Swedenborg’s	postulates,	and	3)	Swedenborg’s	self-confessed	
‘memorabilia’.		
	 Firstly,	associated	with	Swedenborg	are	the	‘anecdotes’,	three	stories	that	are	alleged	to	be	
records	 of	 actual	 events,	 meant	 to	 illustrate	 and	 confirm	 extraordinary	 psychic	 abilities	 in	
Swedenborg.	The	first	one	is	‘The	Queen’s	Secret’	in	which	in	1762	Swedenborg	reportedly	told	the	
Queen	of	Sweden	a	secret	that	he	could	only	have	learned	about	through	communication	with	her	
deceased	 brother.	 The	 second,	 ‘The	 Lost	 Receipt’,	 recounts	 how	 in	 1761	 Swedenborg	 assisted	 a	
widow	in	finding	an	important	receipt	that	was	hidden	by	her	late	husband.	Swedenborg	supposedly	
learned	the	hiding	place	by	communicating	with	the	deceased.	The	last	one,	‘The	Stockholm	Fire’,	is	
very	famous,	as	it	involves	a	tragic	event	that	left	over	2,000	people	homeless.	On	Thursday	July	19,	
1759	 a	 great	 fire	 swept	 over	 Stockholm,	while	 Swedenborg	was	 about	 400	 km	away	 at	 a	 party	 in	
Gothenburg.	Despite	the	fact	that	at	the	time	news	from	Stockholm	would	take	at	least	two	to	three																																																									111	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	613-614.	112	Kirven,	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism,	50-51.	The	‘anecdotes’	are	three	stories	that	were	made	into	causes	célèbres	by	Immanuel	Kant	who	wrote	favourably	about	them	in	his	Brief	an	
Fräulein	von	Knobloch	(presumably	written	in	1763),	and	subsequently	negated	their	veracity	in	his	
Träume	eines	Geistersehers,	erläutert	durch	Träume	der	Metaphysik	(1766).	
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days	to	reach	Gothenburg	by	messenger,	Swedenborg	kept	the	party	informed	of	the	course	of	the	
fire,	even	disclosing	an	exceptional	level	of	detail	on	how	the	disaster	unfolded.			
	 The	veracity	of	each	of	these	anecdotes	is	supported	by	statements	of	witnesses	that	declare	
their	 endorsement	 –	 hence	 ‘declarations’.	 However,	 although	 possible,	 this	 explanation	 does	 not	
seem	 plausible.	 Even	more	 farfetched	 is	 a	 second	 alternative	 in	 which	 the	 ‘declarations’	 point	 to	
statements	made	by	 third	parties.	Historical	 literary	 research	shows	 that	Swedenborg’s	 theological	
writings	generated	several	positive	and	negative	responses,	especially	after	his	death.	For	example,	
Reverend	G.	Beaumont	published	The	anti-Swedenborg:	Or	a	declaration	of	the	principal	errors	and	
anti-scriptural	 doctrines	 contained	 in	 the	 theological	 writings	 of	 Emanuel	 Swedenborg	 (1824);	
another	example	is	Gabriel	Andrew	Beyer	who	wrote	A	declaration	 respecting	the	doctrines	taught	
by	 Emanuel	 Swedenborg	 (1829)	 [emphasis	 added	 in	 both	 titles].	 As	 demonstrated,	 whether	
favourable	 to	 Swedenborg	 or	 not,	 these	 and	 other	 responses	 bear	 the	word	 ‘declaration’	 in	 their	
titles	–	hence,	my	assumption.	However,	I	will	readily	agree	that	this	explanation	is	not	very	likely,	as	
Frothingham	would	undoubtedly	have	mentioned	the	authors	in	his	article.		
	 The	 third	 and	 most	 likely	 option	 is	 that	 by	 ‘declarations’	 Frothingham	 points	 to	 the	
descriptions	of	encounters	with	angels,	devils,	and	spirits	–	remarkable	occurrences	that	Swedenborg	
referred	 to	 as	 ‘memorabilia’.	Apocalypse	 Revealed	 (1766,	 Latin	 title:	Apocalypsis	 Revelata,	 in	 Qua	
Deteguntur	Arcana	Quae	Ibi	Praedicta	Sunt,	et	Hactenus	Recondita	Latuerunt)	was	the	first	book	 in	
which	Swedenborg	added	these	memorable	accounts	of	his	visionary	experiences.	The	descriptions	
are	often	vivid	narratives	of	spiritual	encounters	placed	at	the	end	of	a	chapter.	Last	but	not	least,	I	
found	proof	 to	 support	 this	 assumption.	By	 chance,	while	digging	 through	different	 translations	of	
Swedenborg’s	 work	 I	 found	 a	 quote	 from	 his	 book	 Secrets	 of	 Heaven	 (1749-1756,	 Latin:	 Arcana	
Coelestia,	Quae	in	Scriptura	Sacra,	seu	Verbo	Domini	Sunt,	Detecta;	consisting	of	eight	volumes)	that	
speaks	for	itself.	In	the	latest	translation	from	2010	the	quote	reads	
	
I	 realize	 many	 will	 claim	 that	 no	 one	 can	 talk	 to	 spirits	 and	 angels	 as	 long	 as	 bodily	 life	
continues,	or	that	I	am	hallucinating,	or	that	I	have	circulated	such	stories	in	order	to	play	on	
people’s	credulity,	and	so	on.	But	none	of	this	worries	me;	 I	have	seen,	 I	have	heard,	 I	have	
felt.113	
	
However,	looking	at	a	translation	from	1837,	the	quote	is	much	more	‘revealing’.	
	
																																																								113	Swedenborg,	Secrets	of	Heaven,	68.	[	translation	of	2010,	West	Chester,	PA:	Swedenborg	Foundation,	by	Lisa	Hyatt	Cooper.	]	
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I	am	well	aware	that	many	persons	will	insist	that	it	is	impossible	for	any	one	to	converse	with	
spirits	and	angels	during	his	life	in	the	body;	many,	that	such	intercourse	must	be	mere	fancy	
and	illusion;	others,	that	 I	have	invented	such	relations	 in	order	to	gain	credit;	whilst	others	
will	 indulge	 doubts	 and	 scruples	 of	 different	 sorts.	 All	 these	 objections	 however	 are	 of	 no	
weight	with	me;	 for	 I	have	seen,	heard,	and	had	sensible	experience	of	what	 I	am	about	 to	
declare.	114	[emphasis	added]	
	
Swedenborg	 ‘declares’	 –	 and	 it	 is	 quite	 a	 statement,	 indeed.	 Therefore,	 we	 may	 assume	 with	
confidence	 that	 the	 ‘declarations’	mean	 the	 ‘celestial	 communications’,	 the	 ‘spiritual	 encounters’,	
Swedenborg’s	claims	that	he	‘has	seen	and	has	heard’,	and	his	reluctance	to	write	these	experiences	
off	to	visions,	dreams,	or	other	acceptable	forms	of	altered	states	of	consciousness.	No,	Swedenborg	
insists	that	his	experiences	are	‘real’,	and	it	is	precisely	his	insistence	–	by	way	of	‘declarations’	–	that	
seems	to	present	a	problem	to	Frothingham.		
	
2.8	 Recapitulating:	from	mystical	narrative	to	metaphysical	discourse	
In	the	previous	chapter	we	have	seen	that	Emerson	labelled	–	‘framed’	–	Swedenborg	as	a	‘mystic’.	
He	 is	 not	 troubled	 by	 Swedenborg’s	 visions,	 for	 he	 relates	 these	 to	 intuition	 –	 in	 his	 view	 an	
epistemologically	accepted	manner	of	accessing	divine	truth.	In	fact,	he	approaches	Swedenborg	as	
an	 intellectual	–	 in	a	 (negative)	contrast	 to	Plato.	Emerson	explains	his	mystical	characterization	of	
Swedenborg	on	Swedenborg’s	own	accounts	of	divine	encounters	–	in	view	of	his	assumed	likeness	
to	 Böhme	 and	 other	 ‘bona	 fide’	 mystics	 in	 a	 broad	 historical	 range.	 Emerson’s	 problem	 with	
Swedenborg	 is	with	the	doctrine	of	correspondences,	which	he	 finds	 too	rigid.	And	he	cannot	deal	
with	 the	 postulate	 of	 a	 hierarchical	 universe,	 for	 this	 would	 exclude	 the	 possibility	 of	 individual	
responsibility.		
	 Frothingham,	on	 the	other	hand,	although	he	repeatedly	acknowledges	an	 internal	 logic	 to	
Swedenborg’s	 philosophy,	 has	 difficulty	 overcoming	 the	 revelatory	 origins	 of	 his	 doctrines.	 In	 the	
1882	 article	 he	 refers	 to	 the	 ‘spiritual	 monism’	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophy	 that	 ‘saves	 us	 from	
pantheism’.	 The	 fact	 that	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophy	 did	 not	 involve	 a	 supernaturalist	 ontology,	
correlates	 with	 Frothingham’s	 rationalism.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 his	 problem	 with	 Swedenborg	 is	 his	
claim	to	‘immediate	revelation’.	He	acknowledges	the	radical,	revolutionary	nature	of	Swedenborg’s	
theological	philosophical	system,	and	seems	to	embrace	the	emphasis	on	charity	‘and	belief	built	on																																																									114	Swedenborg,	Arcana	Coelestia,	68.	[	translation	of	1837,	London:	James	S.	Hodson,	full	title:	Arcana	
Coelestia,	The	Heavenly	Arcana	which	are	contained	in	the	Holy	Scriptures	or	Word	of	the	Lord	unfolded,	
beginning	with	the	book	of	Genesis,	together	with	wonderful	things	seen	in	the	world	of	spirits	and	in	the	
heaven	of	angels.]			
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charity’	as	a	road	to	social,	ethical	 reform.	But	he	struggles	with	the	claim	to	 immediate,	empirical	
revelation.		
	 Although	 Frothingham	 explains	 the	 mystical	 characterization	 of	 Swedenborg	 through	
Swedenborg’s	own	‘declarations’	of	divine	encounter,	he	resolutely	rejects	Emerson’s	interpretation.	
He	proposes	 to	 approach	 Swedenborg	 as	 a	 scientist,	which	makes	 sense	 in	 view	of	 Frothingham’s	
lifelong	fascination	with	the	synthesis	of	science	and	religion.	As	said,	Frothingham’s	problem	is	not	
with	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophy	 or	 theology,	 but	 with	 his	 ‘declarations’	 –	 the	 revelatory	 origins	 of	
Swedenborg’s	 thought.	 Hence,	 we	 find	 that	 whereas	 Emerson	 contributed	 to	 a	 narrative	 on	
Swedenborg	 –	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 ‘mystic’	 –,	 Frothingham	 seems	 engaged	 in	 a	 discourse	 on	
metaphysics.		
	
*	*	*	*	*	
	
Arguably,	 as	 a	 young	 minister	 Frothingham	 had	 embraced	 the	 Swedish	 ‘mystic’	 at	 the	 time	 of	
Transcendentalism’s	 heyday.	 But	 upon	 closer	 inspection	 at	 the	 end	 of	 his	 career	 he	 finds	 himself	
troubled	 by	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘declarations’.	 ‘They	 may	 mean	 much	 or	 they	 may	 mean	 little’	 –	 he	
mutters.	But	clearly	they	make	him	very	uneasy.	Why?		
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CHAPTER	3	 THE	EPISTEMOLOGICAL	PROBLEMATIC	OF	‘IMMEDIATE	REVELATION’	
	
Central	 to	 the	 last	 chapter	 is	 the	 question	 of	 how	 to	 account	 for	 Frothingham’s	 aversion	 to	 the	
‘angelic	origins’	of	Swedenborg’s	theology?	This	discussion	is	situated	in	the	broader	perspective	of	
the	study	of	Western	esotericism	through	a	brief	review	of	the	approaches	of	Faivre,	Hanegraaff,	and	
Von	 Stuckrad.	 By	 addressing	 questions	 as	 to	 what	 extent	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘mysticism’	 can	 be	
articulated	 as	 an	 epistemological	 problematic	 of	 revelation,	 and	 how	 this	 problematic	 can	 be	
positioned	 in	 a	 broader	 perspective,	 we	 move	 our	 focus	 from	 religious	 liberalism	 to	 Western	
esotericism.	 First,	 however,	we	will	 look	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 revelatory	 claims.	 From	
there,	we	will	 situate	Swedenborg’s	philosophy	 in	a	historical	 intellectual	movement	known	as	 the	
Revolt	against	Deism.		
	
3.1	 The	nature	of	Swedenborg’s	claim	of	‘immediata	revelatio’	
We	have	seen	that	the	‘declarations’	by	Swedenborg	which	Frothingham	talks	about	are	statements	
of	experiences	that	Swedenborg	declares	as	‘real’.	But	what	is	the	nature	of	this	claim?	With	respect	
to	his	experiences	of	 spiritual	encounters,	 Swedenborg	places	 these	 in	 the	 category	of	 ‘revelation’	
(revelationes)	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘predictions’	 or	 ‘prophecies’	 (prophetiae)	 which	 refer	 to	 his	 ideas	 on	
God	 and	 the	 divine	 purpose	 toward	 Creation.	 Moreover,	 these	 experiences	 were	 ‘sensible	
revelations’	 (revelatio	sensibiliter	 fiebat),	expressing	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 involved	the	physical	senses	
which	at	 the	time	was	understood	to	 include	the	 faculty	of	 reason.	The	 ‘sensible	revelations’	were	
distinct	 from	 other	 varieties	 of	 revelation,	 such	 as	 automatic	 writing	 or	 verbal	 inspiration,	 which	
Swedenborg	claimed	also	to	have	experienced;	therefore,	the	difference	was	clear	to	him.	“Further,	
in	contradistinction	to	that	revelation	which	he	said	is	universally	accessible	through	proper	reading	
of	the	Bible,	his	experiences	of	seeing	and	conversing	with	spirits	and	angels	constituted	‘immediate	
revelation’	(immediata	revelatio)”.115	
	 Even	 Swedenborg	 realized	 that	 his	 claim	 to	 ‘immediate	 revelation’	 by	 means	 of	 sensible	
experience	in	the	spiritual	world	was	hard	to	accept.	However,	despite	his	repeated	assurances	as	to	
the	 validity	 of	 his	 experiences,	 he	 did	 not	 say	 much	 about	 the	 underlying	 idea	 –	 the	 ‘actualized	
possibility	 of	 such	 a	mode	 of	 knowing’	 –	 nor	 did	 he	 venture	 any	 explanation	 on	 how	 this	way	 of	
accessing	 knowledge	 was	 even	 possible.116	Kirven	 has	 coined	 the	 term	 ‘empirical	 revelation’	 to	
denote	 the	 distinctive	 idea	 involving	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	 that	 these	 psychic	 experiences	 were	
																																																								115	Kirven,	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism,	18.	116	Ibid.,	20.	
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revelatory,	and	 that	 the	 revelation	he	was	commissioned	 to	 transmit	 to	 the	world	was	 received	 in	
and	through	these	experiences.117	To	understand	the	full	extent	of	the	claim	Kirven	elaborates:		
	
It	was	not	just	that	Swedenborg	had	‘experienced’	revelation	(a	sense	in	which	all	revelation	
must	 necessarily	 be	 called	 empirical);	 the	 point	 was	 that	 Swedenborg	 claimed	 to	 have	
received	revelation,	not	through	visions	or	voices	for	which	he	was	a	mere	amanuensis,	but	in	
and	through	psychic	experiences	–	experiences	which	he	recorded,	but	also	 interpreted,	and	
whose	data	he	regarded	as	methodologically	compatible	with	all	empirical	data,	and	of	equal	
truth	value	with	the	data	of	sense	perceptions.118	
	
In	other	words:	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	of	 ‘immediate	 revelation’	 –	or	 ‘empirical	 revelation’	 as	 Kirven	
calls	it	–	was	understood	as	being	epistemologically	equivalent,	and	systematically	compatible,	with	
all	empirical	perceptions.		
	
3.2	 Situating	Swedenborg	in	the	Revolt	against	Deism	
In	his	dissertation	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism	(1965)	–	under	the	supervision	
of	 Herbert	 Marcuse 119 	–	 Robert	 Kirven	 has	 investigated	 historical	 responses	 to	 Swedenborg’s	
philosophy.	He	situates	Swedenborg	in	an	intellectual	movement	that	is	known	as	the	Revolt	against	
Deism.	Deism	was	the	product	of	Enlightenment	thinking	in	the	early	eighteenth	century.	Stimulated	
by	 groundbreaking	 advances	 in	 the	 natural	 sciences	 during	 the	 so-called	 Scientific	 Revolution	 in	
seventeenth-century	Europe,	Deism	emerged	as	a	theological	approach	that	can	be	characterized	by	
philosophical	 rationalism,	 rooted	 in	 natural	 theology	 and	 favouring	 human	 reason	 over	 divine	
revelation	as	a	source	of	knowledge.		
	 As	 Deism	 had	 abandoned	 all	 speculation	 on	 the	 ontological	 existence	 of	 supernaturalist	
realms,	the	Revolt	against	Deism	acknowledged	that	a	return	to	supernaturalism	was	inconceivable.	
Hence,	 alternative	 responses	 to	 Deism	 had	 to	 be	 in	 accord	 with	 modern	 advances	 in	 science,	
systematically	 adequate,	 and	 convincing	without	 appeal	 to	 tradition	 as	 an	 authority.	 According	 to	
Kirven,	 Swedenborg	was	 ‘seriously	 affected	by	Deism’,	 as	 a	 result	 of	which	he	 ‘participated	 in	 the	
Revolt	against	Deism,	but	was	not	determined	by	it’.120	He	finds	that		
	
																																																								117	Kirven,	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism,	20.	118	Ibid.,	21.	119	German-American	philosopher,	sociologist	and	political	theorist	Herbert	Marcuse	(1898-1979)	is	associated	with	the	Frankfurt	School	of	Critical	Theory.	120	Kirven,	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism,	3.		
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Swedenborg’s	 personal	 revolt	 against	 Deism	 was	 essentially	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 deist	
concept	of	religion,	on	the	grounds	of	his	conviction	that	Deism	was	not	religious	enough	to	
be	an	adequate	system	of	 religious	thought.	His	expansion	was	primarily	 in	 the	direction	of	
including	 mystical,	 or	 spiritual,	 concepts	 in	 his	 system	 of	 thought;	 he	 tried	 to	 make	 this	
inclusion	consistent	with	his	own	inclination	towards	Rationalism	and	scientific	method.121		
	
In	view	of	 the	nature	of	Swedenborg’s	 claim	 to	 ‘immediate	 revelation’,	 as	we	have	 seen,	his	 ideas	
presented	 a	 radical	 challenge	 to	 systematic	 thought,	 giving	 rise	 to	 feelings	 of	 anxiety.	 For,	 “the	
assumption	 that	 psychic	 and	physical	 data	 could	be	 considered	 together,	 if	 taken	 seriously,	would	
have	 threatened	 the	 philosophy	 of	 being,	 of	 knowledge,	 and	 of	 God…”122	With	 a	 tongue-in-cheek	
reference	to	Immanuel	Kant,	Kirven	likens	the	radical	impact	of	Swedenborg’s	ideas	to	a	Copernican	
Revolution.	 But	 surely,	 this	 is	 no	 laughing	matter.	 For	 the	 anxiety	 involved	 in	 Swedenborg’s	 ideas	
invoked	a	response,	particularly	through	Kant,	that	furthered	the	philosophical	search	in	the	opposite	
direction.		
	
By	 epitomizing	 the	 problems	 of	 epistemological	 certainty	 (since	 Kant’s	 best	 efforts	 could	
neither	confirm	nor	deny	the	truth	of	Swedenborg’s	claim),	it	provided	the	negative	stimulus	
for	 the	 establishment	 of	 boundaries	 which	 would	 confine	 knowledge	 within	 the	 limits	 of	
certainty.	Delineation	of	those	boundaries	 in	the	Critical	Philosophy	excluded	revelation	and	
psychic	perception	from	philosophy,…123	
	
A	 ‘negative	 stimulus	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 boundaries’	 is	 an	 eloquent	 way	 of	 saying	 that	
Swedenborg’s	 claim	 to	 immediate	 or	 empirical	 revelation	was	 rejected	by	 the	 ruling	 philosophers’	
class.	 In	 other	 words,	 knowledge	 that	 cannot	 be	 confined	 within	 the	 limits	 of	 certainty	 –	 more	
specifically:	 knowledge	 that	 is	 obtained	 through	 revelation	 and	 psychic	 perception	 –	 was	 to	 be	
‘rejected’.	And	this	–	 the	notion	of	 ‘rejected	knowledge’	–	brings	us	straight	 to	Wouter	Hanegraaff	
and	the	field	of	Western	esotericism.				
	
3.3	 From	religious	liberalism	to	Western	esotericism	
Shifting	 our	 focus	 from	 religious	 liberalism	 to	 Western	 esotericism	 may	 seem	 like	 a	 big	 step	 –	
effectively	a	quantum	leap.	But	 is	 it?	Over	the	past	two	decades,	the	field	of	 ‘Western	esotericism’	
has	 been	 hotly	 debated	 among	 contemporary	 scholars	 in	 most	 Western	 societies.	 But	 what	 is																																																									121	Kirven,	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism,	16.	122	Ibid.,	24.	123	Ibid.,	313.	
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understood	 by	 ‘Western	 esotericism’,	 and	 how	 to	 approach	 this	 field?	 As	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	
does	 not	 allow	 for	 an	 extensive	 treatment,	 I	 will	 present	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 approaches	 to	
Western	esotericism	by	Antoine	Faivre	(1934-),	Wouter	Hanegraaff	(1961-),	and	Kocku	von	Stuckrad	
(1966-).	Where	possible	and	applicable	I	will	relate	their	positions	to	their	assessment,	classification	
or	categorization	of	Emanuel	Swedenborg.	
	 As	 the	 first	 scholar	 to	 define	Western	 esotericism	 as	 a	 field	 of	 interdisciplinary	 academic	
study,	 Faivre	 posits	 that	 the	 object	 of	 ‘modern	 Western	 esotericism’	 is	 a	 construct	 that	 can	 be	
identified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 four	 fundamental	 characteristics.	 Firstly,	 the	 idea	 of	 universal	
correspondences	 involves	 the	 existence	 of	 symbolic	 connections	 between	 different	 –	 visible	 and	
invisible	 –	 levels	 of	 reality	 in	 the	 universe.	 Moreover,	 besides	 being	 a	 constellation	 of	
correspondences,	the	idea	of	living	Nature	suggests	that	the	cosmos	is	permeated	with	invisible	yet	
active	 forces	 that	work	 together	 as	one	 living	organism.	 Thirdly,	 the	 role	of	mediations	and	of	 the	
imagination	are	complementary	notions	that	provide	the	possibility	of	exchanges	between	different	
levels	of	reality,	e.g.,	the	idea	that	knowledge	is	revealed	by	spiritual	authorities	such	as	gods,	angels,	
spirits.	 Finally,	 the	 experience	 of	 transmutation	 is	 related	 to	 the	 experiential	 character	 that	 is	
associated	with	esoteric	phenomena,	usually	pointing	to	a	spiritual	path	to	inner	metamorphosis.124	
In	 addition,	 Faivre	 suggests	 two	 more	 characteristics	 that	 are	 not	 intrinsic,	 yet	 can	 be	 identified	
frequently;	 these	 involve	 a	 practice	 of	 concordance	 that	 tends	 to	 posit	 common	 denominators	 a	
priori,	and	the	idea	of	transmission	stipulating	the	importance	of	initiation.		
	 	In	studying	esotericism,	Faivre	proposes	to	approach	the	subject	matter	‘historico-critically’,	
making	 sure	 to	avoid	confusion	with	 respect	 to	 terminology	and	definitions,	and	being	cautious	of	
the	 residual	 influence	 of	 theological	models	 or	 presuppositions,	 especially	 of	 the	 Christian	 kind.125	
Despite	 these	 cautions,	 however,	 in	 his	 historical	 overview	 of	 esoteric	 currents	 in	 Europe,	 titled	
Western	Esotericism:	a	concise	history	(2010),	Faivre	classifies	Swedenborg	without	further	ado	as	a	
representative	 of	 a	 theosophical	 tradition	 that	 was	 started	 by	 Jacob	 Böhme.	 Unreservedly,	 Faivre	
views	 Böhme	 as	 the	 ‘founder’	 of	 Christian	 theosophy,	 an	 ‘esoteric’	 current	 that	 displays	 the	
characteristics	 enumerated	 above	 but	 also	 possesses	 three	 characteristics	 that	 serve	 to	 specify	 its	
originality	 within	 the	 esoteric	 landscape.	 These	 ‘distinguishing’	 traits	 of	 Christian	 theosophy	 are	
somewhat	 nebulously	 described	 as	 1)	speculations	 on	 the	God-Humanity-Nature	 triangle,	 2)	 direct	
access	 to	 higher	worlds	 –	 the	mystical	 experience	of	Zentralschau,	 in	 Böhme’s	 terminology	 –,	 and	
																																																								124	Faivre,	Western	Esotericism,	12.		125	Ibid.,	19-20.	
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3)	the	primacy	of	 the	mythical	which	 relates	 to	 the	privileging	of	mythical	 elements	 in	 texts,	most	
notably	Genesis,	the	vision	of	Ezekiel	and	the	Apocalypse.126		
	 In	the	articulation	of	this	theory	Faivre	argues	that	a	common	denominator	of	those	currents	
referred	 to	 as	 ‘esoteric	 traditions’	 was	 a	 specific	 ‘form	 of	 thought’	 (forme	 de	 pensée).	Moreover,	
currents	 and	movements	 that	make	 up	 the	 category	 of	Western	 esotericism	 can	 only	 exist	 as	 the	
products	 of	 specific	 historical	 and	 cultural	 conditions. 127 	Nevertheless,	 the	 eighteenth-century	
‘enlightened	scientist’	Swedenborg	is	understood	by	Faivre	to	fit	the	model	of	Christian	theosophy	as	
set	by	Böhme	over	a	century	earlier.	Arguably,	Swedenborg	did	have	‘mystical’	experiences	and	some	
of	 his	 book	 titles	 mention	 the	 word	 ‘apocalypse’.	 Very	 unsatisfactory	 with	 respect	 to	 Faivre’s	
paradigm,	however,	 is	the	fact	that	his	approach	 ignores	the	particularity	of	Swedenborg’s	thought	
with	respect	to	his	postulates	on	the	nature	of	reality	and	the	way	in	which	these	shaped	his	doctrine	
of	correspondences.		
	 Von	 Stuckrad	 formulates	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 Faivre	 paradigm	 by	 arguing	 that	 Faivre	
extrapolated	 his	 typology	 from	 a	 specific	 phase	 in	modern	 religious	 history	 and	 thereby	 excluded	
other	aspects	from	the	outset.	Faivre’s	theoretical	approach	is	 limited	to	Renaissance	Hermeticism,	
philosophy	of	nature,	Christian	Kabbalah	and	Protestant	theosophy,	resulting	in	an	integrative	model	
of	the	‘esoteric’	that	systematically	combines	several	traditions	and	disciplines.	Essentially,	however,	
according	to	Von	Stuckrad,	it	is	a	typology	that	is	based	on	the	idea	of	what	‘esotericism’	should	be,	
not	what	it	is.128		
	 By	contrast,	Von	Stuckrad	proposes	to	use	an	analytical	model	that	proceeds	from	the	idea	
that	 religious	 pluralism	 has	 always	 been	 a	 historical	 reality	 in	 Europe,	 thereby	 regarding	 not	 only	
Christianity,	 Judaism	 and	 Islam	 but	 also	 many	 European	 polytheisms	 as	 established	 elements	 of	
European	 culture.129	From	 this	 perspective,	 Von	 Stuckrad	 aims	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 a	 discursive	
structure	 is	 operational	 in	Western	 intellectual	 and	 cultural	 history.	 His	 focus	 is	 directed	 towards	
‘continuities	 and	 breaks’	 in	 specific	 historical	 contexts,	 looking	 for	 what	 he	 describes	 as	 ‘esoteric	
fields	 of	 discourse’.130	Put	 in	 a	 nutshell,	 Von	 Stuckrad	 argues	 that	 “esoteric	 discourse	 in	 Western	
culture	 is	 an	 analytical	 framework	 that	 helps	 to	 identify	 genealogies	 of	 identities	 in	 a	 pluralistic	
competition	of	knowledge”.131		
																																																								126	Faivre,	Western	Esotericism,	41-42.	127	Stuckrad,	Locations	of	Knowledge	in	Medieval	and	Early	Modern	Europe.	Esoteric	Discourse	and	Western	
Identities,	46.	128	Stuckrad,	Western	Esotericism:	A	Brief	History	of	Secret	Knowledge,	4-5.	129	Ibid.,	5.	130	Ibid.,	9.	131	Stuckrad,	Locations	of	Knowledge	in	Medieval	and	Early	Modern	Europe,	64.	
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	 If	 I	 understand	 Von	 Stuckrad	 correctly,	 his	 approach	 is	 based	 on	 the	 deconstruction	 and	
analysis	of	‘fields	of	esoteric	discourse’	in	order	to	uncover	a	Wittgensteinian	family	tree	of	Western	
esoteric	movements	and	phenomena	that	are	rooted	 in	Europe’s	cultural	history.	The	focus	should	
be	directed	to	‘continuities	and	breaks’	in	these	discourses.	However,	prior	to	discursive	analysis,	the	
question	 arises	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 ‘fields	 of	 discourse’	 in	 question.	 How	 to	
determine	what	constitutes	‘esoteric	discourse’	–	especially	from	a	historical	perspective?	And	what	
would	Von	Stuckrad’s	approach	entail	with	respect	to	Swedenborg?		
	
3.4	 Von	Stuckrad’s	dialectic	of	‘concealment	and	revelation’	
As	 said,	 Van	 Stuckrad	 introduces	 an	 analytical	 model	 that	 aims	 to	 describe	 the	 dynamic	 and	
processuality	of	‘identity	formation’,	as	well	as	the	discursive	transfers	between	religions	and	societal	
systems.	 In	my	 own	words:	 religious	 phenomena	 and	 currents	 relate	 to	 one	 another	 in	ways	 that	
make	 it	 possible	 to	 identify	 and	 examine	 similarities	 and	differences,	 both	 among	 themselves	 and	
within	 the	 societies	 that	 they	 are	 –	 or	were,	 from	a	historical	 perspective	 –	 part	 of.	 Von	 Stuckrad	
places	 these	 relationships	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 ‘fields	 of	 esoteric	 discourse’.	 In	 Locations	 of	
Knowledge	 in	 Medieval	 and	 Early	 Modern	 Europe	 (2010)	 he	 discusses	 several	 of	 these	 esoteric	
discursive	 fields	 in	 more	 detail,	 specifically	 conveying	 his	 interest	 in	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘Discourses	 of	
Perfect	Knowledge’.132		
	 Von	 Stuckrad	 argues	 that	 when	 people	 –	 like	 Swedenborg	 –	 claim	 a	 superior	 wisdom	 in	
regard	to	competing	interpretations	of	the	universe	and	its	history,	they	claim	a	‘vision	of	truth’	that	
is	‘totalizing’	in	nature:	the	claim	to	superior	knowledge	is	like	a	master	key,	unlocking	the	answers	to	
all	 other	 questions	 of	mankind.	 This	 idea	 of	 higher	 knowledge	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 discourse	 of	 secrecy,	
because,	 according	 to	 Von	 Stuckrad,	 “the	 dialectic	 of	 concealment	 and	 revelation	 is	 a	 structural	
element	of	secretive	discourses”.133	In	opposition	to	Von	Stuckrad,	I	argue	that	in	some	form	or	other	
claims	of	 ‘higher	 knowledge’	 can	be	 viewed	as	part	of	 any	 religious	 tradition	 –	whether	 ‘esoteric’,	
liberal	 or	 traditional.	 Von	 Stuckrad,	 however,	 supports	 his	 argument	 by	 looking	 at	 two	modes	 of	
gaining	access	to	‘perfect	knowledge’	–	mediation	and	experience.134		
	 Mediation	involves	mediators	such	as	angels,	intermediate	beings	or	superior	entities,	often	
described	as	the	source	of	esoteric	knowledge.	Visions	belong	to	the	category	of	experience.	A	vision	
indicates	the	process	of	revelation,	which	may	also	involve	ascension	to	higher	dimensions	of	reality,	
through	meditation,	 trance,	 or	 drug-induced	 altered	 states	 of	 consciousness.	 “Mystical	 experience	
has	repeatedly	been	described	as	an	individual	encounter	with	the	divine	by	means	of	dissolution	of																																																									132	Stuckrad,	Locations	of	Knowledge	in	Medieval	and	Early	Modern	Europe,	59-60.	133	Ibid.,	61.	134	Ibid.,	63.	
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boundaries,	be	they	physiological,	categorical,	or	emotional.”135	For,	 in	a	discursive	analysis	 it	 is	not	
the	content	or	nature	of	religious	experiences	that	is	at	stake,	but	the	fact	that	people	claim	them,	
according	 to	Von	Stuckrad.	Although	 I	understand	the	purport	of	his	argument,	Von	Stuckrad	does	
not	 provide	 adequate	 answers	 to	 questions	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 such	 claims	 to	 higher	
knowledge.		
	 Furthermore,	 Von	 Stuckrad	 qualifies	 Böhme	 and	 Swedenborg	 as	 examples	 of	 ‘totalizing’	
claims	to	knowledge	in	religious	contexts.	Indeed,	we	find	both	modes	of	gaining	access	to	‘perfect	
knowledge’	 –	 mediation	 and	 experience	 –	 in	 Swedenborg’s	 claims.	 However,	 having	 identified	
Swedenborg	 as	 possibly	 engaged	 in	 a	 discursive	 strategy	 involving	 a	 ‘dialectic	 of	 concealment	 and	
revelation’,	 how	 does	 this	 help	 us	 in	 understanding	 Frothingham’s	 objections	 to	 Swedenborg’s	
claims?		
	
3.5	 Hanegraaff’s	notion	of	‘rejected	knowledge’		
So	 far,	 we	 find	 ourselves	 with	 Faivre’s	 integrative	 model	 that	 essentially	 proposes	 a	 substantive	
approach	 to	 ‘esotericism’	on	 the	one	hand,	and	Von	Stuckrad’s	analytical,	discursive	model	on	 the	
other.136	Addressing	discursive	structures	in	historical	perspective	allows	for	a	more	nuanced	analysis	
and	 interpretation	of	 the	past	and	 the	present,	 says	Von	Stuckrad.	But	what	 then	 is	 the	discursive	
structure	at	the	time	of	Frothingham?	In	what	kind	of	discourse	did	he	engage?		
	 A	 third	 –	 and	 more	 satisfying	 –	 approach	 is	 offered	 by	 Hanegraaff	 who	 points	 to	 the	
dominance	of	the	traditional	pillars	of	European	and	American	cultural	identity:	normative	religions	
of	 Judaism	 and	 Christianity,	 rational	 philosophy,	 and	modern	 science.	 He	 posits	 that	 conventional	
thinking	about	Western	culture	excluded	discourses	about	 ‘esotericism’	or	 ‘the	esoteric’	 that	were	
also	part	of	the	religious	landscape.	Hanegraaff	argues	that	‘esotericism’	vanished	almost	completely	
from	 accepted	 intellectual	 discourse	 –	 and	 standard	 textbook	 narratives	 –	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	
Enlightenment.		
	
[T]he	 field	 that	we	now	call	Western	esotericism	may	be	described	as	 the	 chief	 casualty	of	
academic	specialization	after	the	eighteenth	century.	What	initially	sets	it	apart	is	its	modern	
status	as	‘rejected	knowledge’:	it	contains	precisely	everything	that	has	been	consigned	to	the	
dustbin	of	history	by	Enlightenment	ideologues	and	their	intellectual	heirs	up	to	the	present,	
because	 it	 is	 considered	 incompatible	 with	 normative	 concepts	 of	 religion,	 rationality	 and	
science.	Imagined	as	the	radical	counterpart	of	everything	that	educated	people	are	expected	
to	take	seriously,	the	consensus	among	mainstream	intellectuals	after	the	eighteenth	century																																																									135	Stuckrad,	Locations	of	Knowledge	in	Medieval	and	Early	Modern	Europe,	72.	136	Stuckrad,	Western	Esotericism:	A	Brief	History	of	Secret	Knowledge,	11.	
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was	that	this	domain	should	better	be	avoided	and	ignored	in	academic	discourse	rather	than	
being	dignified	by	detailed	study	and	analysis	of	its	ideas	and	their	development.137	
	
As	 a	 result,	 Hanegraaff’s	 model	 of	 ‘esotericism’	 can	 be	 defined	 as:	 1)	 set	 apart	 by	 mainstream	
religious	 and	 intellectual	 culture	 as	 the	 ‘other’	 by	 which	 it	 defines	 its	 own	 identity,	 and	
2)	characterized	 by	 a	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 specific	worldviews	 and	 epistemologies	 that	 are	 at	 odds	
with	 normative	 post-Enlightenment	 intellectual	 culture.	 Central	 to	 his	 position	 is	 the	 notion	 of	
‘rejected	knowledge’,	referring	to	non-rational,	direct	knowledge	of	an	experiential	nature,	and	often	
involving	alterations	of	consciousness.		
	 In	his	articulation	of	Western	esotericism	as	‘rejected	knowledge’	Hanegraaff	concludes	that	
“this	notion	 is	grounded	 (perhaps	surprisingly)	 in	 the	virulent	polemics	of	early	modern	Protestant	
thinkers	around	what	many	of	them	saw	as	a	continuous	tradition	of	pagan	heresy	that	had	begun	in	
very	 ancient	 times	 and	 continued	 until	 the	 present”.	 These	 polemics	 ultimately	 resulted	 in	 a	
persistent	dualism.	“The	 idea	of	a	sharp	dualism	between	‘science	and	superstition’	or	 ‘reason	and	
unreason’,	is	essential	to	our	concerns”.	138		
	
*	*	*	*	*	
	
As	 we	 have	 seen,	 in	 his	 1882	 article	 on	 Swedenborg	 Frothingham	 struggles	 with	 the	 claim	 of	
‘immediate	revelation’,	despite	the	appeal	of	the	anti-dogmatic,	anti-sectarian,	ethical	and	inclusive	
character	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 philosophy.	 	 Certainly,	 we	 may	 distinguish	 the	 contours	 of	 a	 dualism	
between	 ‘reason	 and	 unreason’,	 between	 ‘science	 and	 superstition’	 –	 as	 argued	 by	 Hanegraaff.	
However,	 instead	 of	 engaging	 in	 ‘virulent	 polemics’	 here	 is	 a	man	 of	 integrity	 struggling	with	 the	
nature	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘declarations’	 –	 his	 claim	 to	 ‘immediata	 revelatio’.	 The	 question	 seems	
justified	if	there	could	be	more	to	Frothingham’s	story	than	processes	of	‘rejection’	as	the	result	of	a	
‘persistent	 dualism’.	 So,	 let’s	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 what	 Hanegraaff	 means	 when	 he	 points	 to	
'Protestant	polemics’.		
	
3.6	 Hellenization	of	Christianity	and	anti-apologetic	Protestant	‘polemization’	
Central	to	Hanegraaff’s	argument	is	the	idea	that	‘esotericism’	as	a	separate	field	of	critical	historical	
research	 was	 generated	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	 first	 by	 Jacob	 Thomasius	 (1622-1684),	 and	
subsequently	by	Ehregott	Daniel	Colberg	(1659-1698)	–	both	Lutheran	theologians	–,	based	on	their	
uncovering	of	the	influence	of	Hellenistic	philosophy	on	early	Christianity,	the	so-called	‘Hellenization																																																									137	Hanegraaff,	Western	Esotericism:	A	Guide	for	the	Perplexed,	13.	138	Hanegraaff,	The	Globalization	of	Esotericism,	64.	
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of	Christianity’.	Their	‘anti-apologetic’	approach	–	from	a	spirit	of	Protestant	reform	–	eventually	led	
to	 a	 sharp	 distinction	 between	 three	 domains:	 1)	 Christian	 faith	 based	 exclusively	 on	 the	 biblical	
message,	 2)	 rational	 philosophy	 based	 upon	 the	 legitimate	 but	 limited	 capacities	 of	 the	 human	
intellect,	and	3)	everything	else	–	which	meant	any	kind	of	pagan	religion	as	well	as	 infiltrations	of	
pagan	religions	in	Christianity.139		
A	 central	 concern,	 particularly	 of	 Colberg’s,	 was	 the	 fight	 against	 Protestant	 heterodoxy.	
Colberg	described	 ‘platonic-hermetic’	Christianity	as	 two-faced:	 focused	on	mystical	 interiority	and	
‘enthusiasm’	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	occult	‘sciences’	such	as	alchemy,	astrology	and	magic	on	the	
other. 140 	In	 this	 respect	 Hanegraaff	 points	 specifically	 to	 the	 theosophical	 teachings	 linked	 to	
Paracelsus	(1493/94-1541),	Valentin	Weigel	(1533-1588),	Böhme	and	Rosicrucianism.141	It	should	be	
noted	 in	 passing	 that	 these	 theosophical	 currents	 are	 sixteenth-century	 and	 early	 seventeenth-
century	movements,	whereas	Swedenborg	does	not	arrive	on	the	scene	until	the	eighteenth	century.		
Hanegraaff	 argues	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 Western	 esotericism	 that	 concerns	 itself	 with	 a	
specific	 series	of	historical	 currents	 involves	a	 referential	 corpus	of	 texts.	 In	 this	 sense,	he	 regards	
Colberg’s	 Platonisch-Hermetisches	 Christenthum	 (1690/1)	 as	 the	 landmark	 book	 that	 sparked	 the	
study	of	Western	esotericism	as	a	specific	domain	of	research.	“Colberg’s	book	is	the	first	one,	to	my	
knowledge,	 that	 includes	 essentially	 all	 the	 historical	 currents	 nowadays	 regarded	 as	 central	 to	
‘Western	esotericism’;	and	at	least	as	important	is	the	fact	that	it	does	so	not	randomly,	but	on	the	
basis	of	a	clear	theoretical	concept.	Anti-apologeticism	has	a	compelling	internal	 logic,	according	to	
which	 large	 areas	 of	 Western	 religion	 have	 to	 be	 defined	 as	 manifestations	 of	 pagan/biblical	
syncretism.”142		
Hanegraaff	convincingly	demonstrates	how	the	emergence	of	 ‘esotericism’	 is	 found	 in	anti-
apologetic	 Protestant	 ‘polemization’.	 I	 fully	 agree	 that	 this	 historical	 development	 narrative	 is	
imperative	in	understanding	and	shaping	perceptions	as	to	the	field	of	the	‘esoteric’	today.	Whereas	
much	more	could	be	 said	on	 this	 fascinating	 topic,	unfortunately	 the	 scope	of	 this	 thesis	does	not	
allow	for	further	elaboration.	More	importantly	with	respect	to	our	subject	matter,	however,	are	the	
questions	that	remain	open	with	respect	to	Swedenborg.	If	Hanegraaff	locates	the	‘birth’	of	Western	
esotericism	in	the	conceptualization	of	a	basic	referential	corpus	of	texts	by	Protestant	theologians	in	
the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	 then	 where	 does	 Swedenborg	 fit	 in?	 What	 about	 a	
connection	 to	Böhme?	And	even	more	pressingly,	how	 to	account	 for	 Frothingham’s	 struggle	with	
Swedenborg’s	claims?																																																										139	Hanegraaff,	The	Birth	of	Esotericism	from	the	Spirit	of	Protestantism,	209-10.	140	Ibid.,	210-11.	141	Ibid.,	210.	142	Ibid.,	211.	
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3.7	 Explaining	Frothingham’s	struggle	through	‘esoteric	innovation’		
Frothingham’s	 uneasiness	 with	 respect	 to	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	 of	 ‘immediata	 revelatio’	 cannot	 be	
explained	 from	his	background	as	a	Unitarian	minister	who	developed	 into	the	spokesman	of	 ‘free	
religion’.	 Although	 his	 liberal	 religious	 beliefs	 changed	 –	 ‘radicalized’	 –	 over	 time,	 he	 never	
abandoned	the	concept	of	 ‘divine	revelation’;	 in	fact	he	expanded	the	concept	to	 include	historical	
‘revelations’	of	other	faith	traditions.	Moreover,	even	as	a	free	religionist	Frothingham	supported	the	
Transcendentalist	 notion	 of	 ‘intuitionism’,	 of	 a	 religiously	motivated	way	 ‘inwards’,	 of	 the	 idea	 of	
‘knowing	God	by	knowing	thyself’	–	as	part	of	his	belief	that	humanity	is	a	carrier	of	the	divine.		
The	problem	that	Frothingham	is	faced	with,	in	my	opinion,	is	that	Swedenborg’s	revelatory	
experiences	 seem	to	 involve	an	epistemology	 that	 comprises	a	 supernaturalist	ontology	–	while	at	
the	same	time	denying	this.	For,	Swedenborg	postulates	a	spiritual	world	that	is	in	accordance	with	
reason	but	not	in	an	empirical	sense.	In	the	simplest	terms:	Swedenborg’s	postulate	on	the	nature	of	
reality	comprises	both	 the	 finite	and	the	 infinite,	whereby	 the	 finite	 is	 represented	by	 the	physical	
and	the	infinite	by	the	psychic	or	spiritual.	And	it	presents	a	clear	and	immediate	problem:	for,	how	
can	this	be?	And	what	would	it	entail?		
	 Hanegraaff	 informs	 us	 of	 an	 ‘esoteric	 innovation’	 by	 Swedenborg.	 He	 is	 critical	 of	 the	
discursive	 model	 by	 Von	 Stuckrad,	 as	 he	 considers	 it	 limited	 by	 the	 scholar’s	 own	 interests	 that	
function	as	a	 filter.143	However,	Hanegraaff	agrees	 to	 the	 importance	of	 recognizing	discontinuities	
and	 differences	with	 respect	 to	 historical	 currents,	 ideas	 and	 practices	 that	 fall	 in	 the	 category	 of	
Western	esotericism.144	One	such	discontinuity	can	be	 related	 to	Swedenborg,	who,	we	know,	was	
an	eighteenth-century	intellectual	–	unlike	Böhme.	Swedenborg	presented,	as	Hanegraaff	puts	it,	the	
spiritual	world	as	wholly	 separate	 from,	and	at	 the	same	time	 in	perfect	harmony	with,	a	material	
world	that	answered	to	the	laws	of	post-Cartesian	physics,	whereby	everything	in	the	material	world	
reflects	 or	 corresponds	 to	 the	 spiritual	 world	 by	 divine	 design.	 Swedenborg’s	 worldview	 was,	 in	
short,	an	excellent	example	of	‘esoteric	innovation’.145		
	 Hence,	Hanegraaff	does	not	align	Swedenborg	with	Böhme.	Instead	he	identifies	a	core	text	
that	 is	 part	 of	 a	 process	 of	 Protestant	 ‘polemization’	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 namely	 Immanuel	
Kant’s	Träume	 eines	Geistersehers,	 erläutert	 durch	 Träume	 der	Metaphysik	 (1766).	 Hanegraaff	 has	
done	 extensive	 research	 on	 the	 dynamics	 and	 complexities	 of	 Kant’s	 response	 to	 Swedenborg’s	
visionary	theology,	and	I	regret	that	this	thesis	is	too	short	to	get	into	the	details	of	the	Swedenborg-
Kant	casus.	However,	 I	will	highlight	Hanegraaff’s	position	that	Kant	did	not	so	much	disagree	with	
Swedenborg	as	that	he	–	for	multiple	reasons	–	felt	compelled	to	ridicule	and	disqualify	Swedenborg																																																									143	Hanegraaff,	The	Power	of	Ideas:	Esotericism,	Historicism,	and	the	Limits	of	Discourse,	255.	144	Hanegraaff,	Western	Esotericism:	A	Guide	for	the	Perplexed,	119.	145	Ibid.,	126.	
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from	 further	 intellectual	 discourse. 146 	From	 this	 Hanegraaff	 concludes	 that	 Kant’s	 Träume	 has	
contributed	massively	to	the	polemical	demarcation	of	‘esotericism’	from	–	‘official’,	in	Hanegraaff’s	
words147	–	domains	of	philosophy,	theology,	and	science.		
The	 Swedenborg-Kant	 casus	 seems	 to	 resonate	 with	 the	 reluctance	 that	 Frothingham	
displayed	 in	 his	 treatise	 of	 Swedenborg	 in	 1882.	 Remember	 Frothingham’s	 articulation	 on	 the	
importance	of	the	‘declarations’:	‘if	they	mean	much’	–	meaning	if	Swedenborg’s	claim	is	accepted	as	
valid	–	‘they	contain	a	system	of	philosophy	which	approaches	from	a	new	direction	the	profoundest	
problems	 of	 being	 –	 creation,	 consciousness,	 freedom’.148	We	 found	 a	 similar	 caution	with	 Kirven:	
“the	 assumption	 that	 psychic	 and	 physical	 data	 could	 be	 considered	 together,	 if	 taken	 seriously,	
would	have	threatened	the	philosophy	of	being,	of	knowledge,	and	of	God…”149	And	so	we	find	that	
the	stakes	are	high.	While	Kant	felt	compelled	to	ridicule	Swedenborg,	Frothingham	is	willing	to	state	
the	issue	–	and	acknowledge	the	impossibility	to	formulating	an	answer	to	it.		
	
3.8	 Recapitulating:	on	the	epistemological	problematic	of	‘immediate	revelation’	
In	the	1882	article	Frothingham	struggles	with	Swedenborg’s	claim	of	‘immediate	revelation’.	Despite	
the	 appeal	 of	 the	 anti-dogmatic,	 anti-sectarian,	 ethical	 and	 inclusive	 character	 of	 Swedenborg’s	
thought	Frothingham	is	troubled	by	his	claims	to	the	‘angelic	origin’	of	his	writings.	We	have	found	
that	this	aversion	cannot	be	explained	by	Frothingham’s	beliefs.	As	a	result	we	have	shifted	our	focus	
from	religious	liberalism	to	Western	esotericism.		
	 Hanegraaff’s	 notion	 of	 ‘rejected	 knowledge’	 as	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 modern	 study	 of	
Western	 esotericism	 helps	 to	 understand	 the	 polemical	 dynamics	 involved	 from	 a	 historical	
perspective.	 Frothingham	 struggles	 with	 the	 claims	 of	 ‘immediate	 revelation’	 by	 Swedenborg.	
However,	 instead	 of	 engaging	 in	 ‘virulent	 polemics’	 here	 is	 a	man	 of	 integrity	 struggling	with	 the	
nature	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘declarations’	 –	 his	 claim	 to	 ‘immediata	 revelatio’.	 The	 question	 seems	
justified	if	there	could	be	more	to	the	story	than	processes	of	‘rejection’	as	the	result	of	a	‘persistent	
dualism’.		
	 The	nature	of	Swedenborg’s	claim	can	be	articulated	as	an	‘esoteric	innovation’	–	as	coined	
by	 Hanegraaff.	 This	 ‘innovation’	makes	 sense	 in	 view	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 place	 in	 history,	 especially	
when	situated	in	the	eighteenth-century	intellectual	movement	known	as	the	Revolt	against	Deism.	
Swedenborg’s	postulate	of	a	spiritual	world	that	is	in	accordance	with	reason	but	not	in	an	empirical	
sense,	 sparked	 a	 polemical	 response	 from	 Kant	 in	 1766,	 furthering	 the	 process	 of	 Protestant																																																									146	Hanegraaff,	Swedenborg	en	de	andere	Kant.	Over	de	droom	van	de	Rede	en	de	geest(en)	van	de	
Verlichting,	17-18.	147	Hanegraaff,	The	Birth	of	Esotericism,	211.	148	Frothingham,	Swedenborg,	613-614.	149	Kirven,	Emanuel	Swedenborg	and	the	Revolt	against	Deism,	24.	
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‘polemization’,	 and	 contributing	 to	 a	 discourse	 of	 ‘persistent	 dualism’	 between	 reason	 and	
‘irrationality’.	 However,	 the	 issue	 that	 Kant	 tries	 to	 ‘mystify’	 is	 recognized	 and	 acknowledged	 by	
Frothingham.		
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CONCLUSION	
In	 this	 thesis	 we	 have	 met	 Octavius	 Brooks	 Frothingham,	 a	 New	 England	 religious	 liberal.	 In	
retrospect	 we	 find	 that	 his	 theological	 development	 mirrored	 the	 times.	 As	 a	 young	 minister	
Frothingham	 aligned	 himself	 with	 Unitarianism	 and	 Transcendentalism.	 Over	 time	 he	 became	
progressively	more	 radical	 in	 his	 approach	 to	 faith	 and	 religion.	 After	 the	 Civil	War,	 he	 detached	
himself	 from	Unitarianism,	and	developed	a	 radical,	 ethical	 ‘religion	of	humanity’.	By	1874	he	had	
become	one	of	America’s	foremost	advocates	of	‘free	religion’.	Frothingham	can	be	characterized	as	
a	 preacher,	 a	 scholar,	 an	 intellectual,	 and	 a	 prolific	writer.	Most	 of	 his	 three	 hundred	 and	 eleven	
sermons	 were	 published	 and	 widely	 circulated.	 Typically,	 in	 his	 sermons	 and	 essays	 Frothingham	
would	use	orthodox	symbolism	in	order	to	advance	radical	groundbreaking	ideas.	He	paired	a	gentle	
manner	 to	 an	 uncompromising	 intellect	 and	 a	 fiery	 spirit.	 In	 the	 spring	 of	 1879	 he	was	 forced	 to	
retire	from	the	Independent	Church	because	of	a	creeping	paralysis.	Two	years	later,	he	returned	to	
Boston	where	he	passed	on	November	27,	1895,	the	day	after	his	seventy-third	birthday.	
	 This	thesis	addresses	the	topic	of	revelation	as	a	form	of	divine-human	encounter	from	the	
perspective	of	epistemology.	Central	is	the	claim	to	‘immediate	revelation’	by	Emanuel	Swedenborg	
and	 the	 epistemological	 problematic	 that	 this	 claim	 involved	 –	 as	 perceived	 by	 Frothingham.	My	
research	has	been	guided	by	the	research	question:		
	
What	does	Frothingham’s	article	on	Swedenborg	of	June	1882	in	the	North	American	Review	
tell	 us	 about	 nineteenth-century	 American	 religious	 liberalism	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
epistemological	problematic	of	‘immediate	revelation’?		
	
Highlighting	 the	 main	 elements	 from	 the	 1882	 article	 we	 find:	 (a)	 In	 Frothingham’s	
assessment	all	 liberal	 churches	are	 fastly	becoming	exinct,	 including	 the	New	Church.	Although	his	
tone	 is	mild,	 Frothingham	observes	 that	 religious	 liberalism	 seems	 to	 have	 reached	 the	 end	 of	 its	
rope.	(b)	To	his	surprise	Frothingham	finds	that	Swedenborg’s	philosophy	harmonizes	with	his	own	
anti-dogmatic,	 anti-sectarian,	 ethical	 and	 inclusive	 ‘religion	 of	 humanity’.	 Moreover,	 Frothingham	
interprets	Swedenborg’s	philosophy	as	even	more	‘radical’,	offering	both	a	spiritual	monotheism	that	
‘saves	from	pantheism’,	as	well	as	a	blueprint	for	social	reform.	(c)	Therefore,	Swedenborg	had	best	
be	 approached	 as	 a	 philosopher	 and	 a	 social	 reformer.	 Frothingham	 resolutely	 rejects	 the	
Emersonian	‘frame’	of	Swedenborg	as	a	mystic.	(d)	Although	Frothingham	acknowledges	an	internal	
logic	 to	Swedenborg’s	philosophy,	he	struggles	with	his	claim	to	 ‘immediata	 revelatio’,	 the	 ‘angelic	
origins’	 of	 his	 revelations	 –	 specifically	 the	 ‘declarations’	 that	 carry	 the	 potential	 of	 a	 complete	
revision	of	the	philosophical	status	quo.		
The	above	has	led	to	the	following	observations	and	conclusions:		
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(1)	 Frothingham’s	 struggle	 with	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	 to	 ‘immediate	 revelation’	 cannot	 be	
explained	 from	his	background	as	a	Unitarian	minister	who	developed	 into	the	spokesman	of	 ‘free	
religion’.	 Although	 his	 liberal	 religious	 beliefs	 changed	 –	 ‘radicalized’	 –	 over	 time,	 he	 never	
abandoned	the	concept	of	 ‘divine	revelation’;	 in	fact	he	expanded	the	concept	to	 include	historical	
‘revelations’	of	other	faith	traditions.	Moreover,	even	as	a	free	religionist	Frothingham	supported	the	
Transcendentalist	 notion	 of	 ‘intuitionism’,	 of	 a	 religiously	motivated	way	 ‘inwards’,	 of	 the	 idea	 of	
‘knowing	God	by	knowing	thyself’	–	as	part	of	his	belief	that	humanity	is	a	carrier	of	the	divine.		
	
(2)		 Likewise,	Frothingham’s	struggle	cannot	be	explained	from	the	field	of	Western	esotericism,	
nor	from	a	prevailing	dualism	between	‘reason	and	unreason’,	which	may	even	have	 involved	peer	
pressure	in	view	of	the	alleged	‘recanting’	of	his	belief	shortly	before	the	writing	of	the	1882	article.	
Clearly,	Frothingham	does	not	engage	in	a	dialectic	of	‘secret	knowledge’,	as	Von	Stuckrad	proposes.	
And	he	seems	unaffected	by	Protestant	‘polemizations’.	Shifting	our	focus	from	religious	liberalism	to	
Western	 esotericism	has,	 however,	 helped	 to	 uncover	 the	 dynamic	 behind	 Frothingham’s	 struggle	
which	can	be	 related	 to	 the	nature	of	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	 to	 ‘immediate	 revelation’.	 In	particular,	
the	historicist	approach	by	Hanegraaff	and	his	notion	of	 ‘rejected	knowledge’	were	 instrumental	 in	
identifying	the	issue	at	stake,	convincingly	demonstrating	how	the	emergence	of	‘esotericism’	can	be	
related	to	anti-apologetic	Protestant	‘polemization’.	
	
(3)	 Ultimately,	 Frothingham’s	 struggle	 must	 be	 explained	 from	 the	 problem	 of	 ‘immediate	
revelation’	–	meaning	the	specific	nature	of	Swedenborg’s	claim	which	involves	assumptions	on	the	
ontological	status	of	spiritual	versus	material	reality,	and	the	epistemological	status	of	psychic	versus	
physical	perceptions.	Put	differently:	in	his	‘revelatory	experiences’	Swedenborg	relates	the	physical	
to	the	psychic,	 linking	reason	to	consciousness,	mixing	the	worlds	of	 ‘thinking	and	touching’	and	of	
‘feeling	and	awareness’.	But,	in	doing	so,	he	threatens	the	philosophical	status	quo.		
	
(4)		 Interestingly,	Hanegraaff	finds	that	“the	entire	reservoir	of	‘rejected	knowledge’	became	an	
object	 of	 intense	 fascination	 for	 Romantics	 and	 other	 critics	 of	 the	 Enlightenment	 during	 the	 19th	
century,	precisely	because	of	its	perceived	alterity	vis-à-vis	socially	dominant	models	of	science	and	
rationality”.150	Among	those	Romantics	we	may	find	Emerson	and	the	American	Transcendentalists,	
explaining	the	nascent	interest	in	‘mysticism’	in	nineteenth-century	New	England.	In	his	portrayal	of	
																																																								150	Hanegraaff,	The	Globalization	of	Esotericism,	67	(italics	by	Hanegraaff).	
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Swedenborg	 as	 the	 archetypical	 ‘mystic’	 Emerson	 likens	 him	 to	 Böhme,	 a	 ‘frame’	 that	 may	 have	
affected	Faivre,	Von	Stuckrad	and	others	–	but	one	that	is	fully	rejected	by	Frothingham.		
	
(5)	 The	 nature	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	 –	 his	 ‘esoteric	 innovation’,	 as	 coined	 by	 Hanegraaff	 –	
makes	 sense	 in	 view	 of	 his	 place	 in	 history,	 especially	 when	 situated	 in	 the	 eighteenth-century	
intellectual	 movement	 known	 as	 the	 Revolt	 against	 Deism.	 Swedenborg’s	 postulate	 of	 a	 spiritual	
world	that	is	in	accordance	with	reason	but	not	in	an	empirical	sense,	sparked	a	polemical	response	
from	 Kant	 in	 1766,	 furthering	 the	 process	 of	 Protestant	 ‘polemization’,	 and	 contributing	 to	 a	
discourse	of	‘persistent	dualism’	between	reason	and	‘irrationality’.		
	
(6)	 Evidently,	 no	 judgment	 is	 possible	 as	 to	 the	 validity	 of	 Swedenborg’s	 claim	 to	 ‘immediate	
revelation’,	simply	because	the	nature	of	the	claim	precludes	objective	demonstration	or	refutation.	
In	 1766	 Kant	 recognized	 the	 complex	 dynamics	 involved	 in	 Swedenborg’s	 ‘declarations’.	 He	 felt	
compelled	 to	 ridicule	Swedenborg,	not	 in	 the	 least	because	he	was	 concerned	about	his	academic	
reputation.	 In	1882,	over	a	century	 later,	Frothingham	is	confronted	with	the	same	issue.	But	he	 is	
more	brave	than	Kant,	and	displays	more	integrity	–	typical	for	a	New	England	religious	liberal.		
	
Some	final	remarks	on	Spiritualism		
In	my	research	I	had	anticipated	to	find	a	discursive	relation	–	in	terms	of	a	dialogue	of	opposition	or	
conflict	–	between	Unitarians	and	Spiritualists	with	respect	to	their	 interpretations	of	Swedenborg.	
Although	this	turned	out	not	to	be	the	case,	I	did	find	a	slight	connection	between	Spiritualism	and	
the	Free	Religious	Association.	Spiritualism	is	understood	as	“a	religious	movement	emphasizing	the	
belief	 in	 survival	 after	 death,	 a	 belief	 spiritualists	 claim	 is	 based	 upon	 scientific	 proof,	 and	 upon	
communication	 with	 the	 surviving	 personalities	 of	 deceased	 human	 beings	 by	 means	 of	
mediumship”.151	The	origins	of	Spiritualism	 in	America	are	often	 related	 to	 specific	events	 in	1848:	
“…when	 the	 sisters	Maggie	 and	 Katie	 Fox	 started	 communicating	 with	 spirits	 through	 rappings	 in	
their	 house	 at	 Hydesville,	 New	 York”.152	The	 success	 of	 the	 Fox	 sisters	 seemed	 to	 inspire	 other	
mediums,	and	by	the	mid-1850s	spiritualism	had	gained	a	considerable	popularity.		
“The	 Civil	 War	 made	 Spiritualism	 a	 religious	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 first	 importance.	 The	
pretension	 of	 its	mediums	 to	 prove	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 spiritual	world	 by	 scientific	methods	 gave	 a	
pseudo-rationalistic	 flavor	 to	 a	 faith	 having	 little	 else	 of	 a	 positive	 character	 in	 common	 with	
																																																								151	Lewis,	Odd	Gods:	New	Religions	&	the	Cult	Controversy,	337.	152	Ibid.,	339.	
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rationalism.”153	Free	 religionists,	however,	 saw	 in	Spiritualism	a	manifestation	of	 the	craving	of	 the	
popular	mind	 for	 the	supernatural,	and	 they	 invited	 the	Spiritualists	 to	share	 the	work	of	 the	FRA.	
Besides	 their	 joined	 rejection	of	 Christian	orthodox	dogmas	on	 salvation,	 redemption,	 heaven	and	
hell,	 both	groups	 shared	a	 ‘millennial	hope’	–	eschatological	 speculations	 involving	 the	doctrine	of	
the	 end	 times:	 Spiritualists	 simply	 founded	 their	 beliefs	 on	 spirit	 communications,	 the	 Free	
religionists	projected	faith	in	a	humanistic	millennium	on	earth.154	As	far	I	have	been	able	to	discover,	
the	cooperation	did	not	yield	any	significant	results	from	a	religious	reform	perspective.			
	
Epilogue	
Although	I	have	thoroughly	enjoyed	working	on	this	thesis,	I	will	have	to	admit	that	the	1882	article	
‘Swedenborg’	by	O.B.	Frothingham	is	not	really	a	good	analysis	of	Swedenborg	nor	is	it	well	written.	
Certain	paragraphs	are	very	confusing,	especially	when	Frothingham	engages	in	exegetical	exercise,	
nor	does	he	succeed	 in	explaining	some	of	Swedenborg’s	concepts,	e.g.,	 the	 idea	of	heaven	as	 the	
‘maximus	homo’,	the	supreme	man.	Moreover,	the	article	seems	to	contain	a	painful	mistake	in	the	
reference	to	‘F.H.	Channing’	(on	page	602)	–	which	is	likely	to	refer	to	either	F.H.	–	Frederic	Henry	–	
Hedge	(1805-1890)	or	William	Ellery	Channing	(1818-1901).	Still,	all	is	forgiven	in	view	of	the	integrity	
that	Frothingham	displayed,	both	in	the	development	of	his	ethical	religious	beliefs	over	time	and	in	
his	honest	approach	to	Swedenborg’s	thought.			
	 So	 much	 more	 could	 be	 said	 about	 ‘mystical’	 elements	 in	 Transcendentalism,	 about	
Frothingham	and	his	‘religion	of	humanity’,	about	Swedenborg’s	theological	writings	that	turned	out	
to	be	a	mer	à	boire.	But	the	scope	of	this	thesis	is	limited.	In	his	article	Frothingham	proposed	that	
Henry	James	Sr	would	the	person	most	qualified	to	‘dig	out	a	treasure	of	thought	worthy	to	be	kept’	
with	respect	to	Swedenborgian	teachings.	Unfortunately,	whereas	Emerson	had	passed	in	April,	the	
elder	James	died	in	December,	both	in	1882	–	the	year	the	article	was	published.		
	 In	his	Recollections	and	 Impressions	 Frothingham	declares	how	he	always	 loved	the	sonnet	
‘To	Night’	by	Joseph	Blanco	White	(1775-1841).155	He	goes	on	to	explain	how	he	never	appreciated	
its	full	significance	until	he	developed	the	scientific	view	that	succeeded	the	transcendental,	and	he	
began	“to	walk	by	knowledge,	steadily	and	surely,	but	not	buoyantly	any	more”.156	Upon	reading	this	
																																																								153	Persons,	Free	Religion:	An	American	Faith,	103-4.	154	Ibid.,	104-5.	155	Blanco	was	a	Spanish	Catholic	priest	who	entered	and	abandoned	several	positions,	institutions,	and	faiths	during	his	lifetime.	During	the	French	invasion	he	left	Spain	and	emigrated	to	England	where	he	became	an	Anglican	minister.	Later	he	abandoned	Anglicanism	in	favour	of	Unitarianism.	From:	Fernández,	J.,	‘A	Life	of	Readings,	the	Readings	of	a	Life:	Joseph	Blanco	White’,	Revista	de	Estudios	
Hispánicos	24.2	(May	1,	1990):	121-142.	156	Frothingham,	Recollections	and	Impressions,	137-8.		
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poem	 I	was	 struck	by	 its	 appropriateness	–	 in	more	ways	 than	one	–	 to	 the	 subject	matter	 in	 this	
thesis.	And	so,	by	way	of	closure	–		
	
Mysterious	Night!	when	our	first	parent	knew	
Thee	from	report	divine,	and	heard	thy	name,	
Did	he	not	tremble	for	this	lovely	frame,	
This	glorious	canopy	of	light	and	blue?	
Yet	'neath	a	curtain	of	translucent	dew,	
Bathed	in	the	rays	of	the	great	setting	flame,	
Hesperus	with	the	host	of	heaven	came,	
And	lo!	Creation	widened	in	man's	view.	
Who	could	have	thought	such	darkness	lay	concealed	
Within	thy	beams,	O	Sun!	or	who	could	find,	
Whilst	fly	and	leaf	and	insect	stood	revealed,	
That	to	such	countless	orbs	thou	mad'st	us	blind!	
Why	do	we	then	shun	death	with	anxious	strife?	
If	Light	can	thus	deceive,	wherefore	not	Life?	
	
*	*	*	*	*	
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